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INTRODUCTION 
Reform in federal regulations is changing how producers manage manure in the 
agricultural industry.  Structural changes occurring in the livestock production industry 
have resulted in many animal feeding operations over-applying manure nutrients to the 
land.  This practice has created pollution problems in water quality and induced policy 
reform.  Because of the people affected, the issue has become one of public debate 
complicated by innumerable factors.  Topics often cited for problems are the geographic 
concentration of livestock and poultry industries, a receding interface between rural and 
urban societies, economic motivation for production facilities to increase in size, the 
economic incentive for producers to over-apply manure, and environmental degradation 
perceived to be a direct result of unfriendly agricultural practices.   
Over the years, livestock and poultry manure has been applied to land as an 
organic fertilizer providing nutrients to both crops and pastures.  Once the prominent 
source of fertilizer nutrients, animal manure was rapidly replaced with commercial 
fertilizers to provide precise and less costly applications of the three main crop nutrients 
(nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium) needed to achieve maximum production yields.  
Commercial fertilizers offer several benefits over livestock manure.  They provide 
nutrient ratios that meet the exact requirements of a specific crop; nutrient application 
rates are more consistent; and a less bulky fertilizer results in lower transportation costs 
and soil compaction from reduced field travel (Feinerman, Bosch, and Pease).  As 
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commercial fertilizer use became widespread due to its economic benefits, animal 
manure began to accumulate at animal feeding operations.  As this movement coincided 
with the consolidation of animal agriculture, manure became viewed as a waste rather 
than a nutrient source.  The livestock industry was witnessing consolidation and 
integration of organizations leading to larger, more regionally concentrated animal 
feeding operations.  Producers began to specialize in single specie production and moved 
away from self-sufficiency, by purchasing feed rather than growing feed crops.  The need 
for cropland was reduced causing livestock producers to own fewer acres of land and 
animal units per acre to rise.  Because the demand for livestock manure has declined and 
the cost to transport manure nutrients long distances exceeds the economic benefits of 
manure nutrients, producers have an incentive to apply nutrients to fields at rates 
exceeding the nutrient requirements of the crop or pasture.  As manure is over-applied, 
excess nutrient levels build up in the soils and leach into to surface and ground waters, 
adversely affecting water quality.   
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that 20% of all U.S. water 
quality problems involve agriculture.  This evident abuse by producers over-applying 
manure nutrients has induced numerous policy changes supported by environmentalists, 
governments, and the general public.  As a result, governmental regulations on animal 
feeding operations are increasing.  For many operations, the regulations increase costs 
and reduce profitability.  Revisions made to the 1972 Clean Water Act are forcing many 
livestock operations to seek off-farm acres for manure removal.  As operations seek to 
become compliant by the end of 2006, numerous articles note that compliance costs for 
livestock operations depend on the distance manure must be transported and the 
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willingness of crop producers to pay for manure.  Therefore, determining the willingness-
to-pay (WTP) of crop producers will be the primary component for estimating total cost 
of the policy.   
Currently, crop producers’ willingness-to-pay has not been estimated.  To 
determine WTP, a number of crop producer factors must be measured to determine their 
effects on WTP.  Some of the factors include the specific type of animal manure, types of 
crops and livestock managed, previous crop producer experience with spreading manure, 
whether the manure is in solid or liquid form, and how the manure is applied (topical or 
subsurface application).  Better understanding the significance of these factors will assist 
in identifying specific manure attributes preferred by crop producers.  The primary 
research question will be, “What is Oklahoma crop producers’ willingness-to-pay for 
livestock manure?”  Secondly, “What is the distribution of crop producers’ willingness-
to-pay?” 
 
Livestock Manure Applications and Negative Externalities 
Animal agriculture’s restructuring has prompted the production of more meat at a 
lower cost.  However, many adverse consequences are the result of this industrialization.  
The primary issue related to the livestock industry is the proliferation of confined animal 
feeding operations1 and the subsequent manure management issues.  As the livestock 
industries have become regionally concentrated, so too have the feed grain nutrients used 
to grow these animals.  Concentrating facilities and decreasing the number of acres per 
animal unit increases the probability that excess nutrients will leach from the soil and 
                                                 
1 Confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs) are feeding operations that have more than 1,000 animal 
units at a specific location.  Operations with fewer than 1,000 animal units can be defined as a CAFO for 
other reasons defined by the Environmental Protection Agency. 
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enter ground or surface water.  Mullen and Centner note that 90% of manure does not 
leave the geographic area in which it is produced.  The reason many of these nutrients 
remain on-site after harvesting the animals is because removal of the nutrients is 
expensive.  This often promotes applying manure at rates higher than what the crop or 
forage can use in a growing season.  The problem is not finding available land, as much 
of the nation has adequate land for spreading manure in safe amounts.  Rather, the cost of 
transporting manure exceeds the nutrient value.  Manure is valuable as both a fertilizer 
and a soil conditioner, but its low market value and cost to transport mitigates any 
benefit, motivating producers to seek the least cost disposal method and over-apply.  
Reasons for low market value of manure include the bulkiness of the product that incurs 
additional transportation costs and soil compaction, varying nutrient content, and other 
potential contaminants such as disease and weeds (Alberta Government).  
The industrialization and regionalization of the livestock industries has brought 
more attention to livestock pollution because of the increased potential for environmental 
degradation.  A publication by the USDA, released in December of 2000, provides 
perspective about the seriousness of nutrient overloading and the potential for water 
pollution.  Kellogg et al. focus on the increasing frequency of manure loading on land in 
the immediate proximity of confined animal feeding operations (CAFO).  As stated 
earlier, the cost of hauling manure only a short distance can exceed its economic benefit.  
This causes much of the cropland surrounding a CAFO to receive manure nutrients far 
exceeding the assimilative capacity of a crop during the growing season.  If manure is not 
exported, the opportunity for nutrient buildup and subsequent runoff greatly increases as 
rates exceed crop demands.  If the probability of pollution does increase with farm size, 
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then there is great need for concern.  In 1997, 48.6% of the confined animal units in the 
U.S. were on farms that could qualify as CAFOs (Kellogg et al.).  This suggests that 
many of the operations are faced with increasing animal units per acre and land 
constraints that may provide incentive for many operations to over-apply nutrients.   
Taking a closer look at excess nutrients, the study estimates the number of 
counties across the nation in which manure nutrients from livestock operations exceed the 
respective county’s assimilative capacity.  Assuming land application of manure is the 
only fertilization technology in practice and all county pasture and cropland is available 
for manure spreading, 73 counties in the U.S. have excess manure nitrogen2 and 160 
counties have excess manure phosphorus3.  This is despite the fact that the USDA admits 
that transporting some manure nutrients across a county for application is impractical.  
Figure 1 demonstrates the trend of increasing quantities of excess nutrients for both 
nitrogen and phosphorus at potential CAFOs from 1982 to 1997.  Furthermore, since 
1982, the percentage of counties with excess nitrogen and phosphorus increased by 103% 
and 57 %, respectively.  This suggests that consolidation and deteriorating waste 
management practices are becoming more widespread and leading to excess nutrients that 
are known contributors to water pollution.   
                                                 
2 Defined as the imbalance between the nitrogen assimilative capacity of the cropland and the quantity of 
manure nitrogen produced in the county. 
3 Defined as the imbalance between the phosphorus assimilative capacity of the cropland and the quantity 
of manure phosphorus produced in the county. 
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Figure 1.  Excess Manure Nutrients for Potential CAFOs 
Source: Kellogg et al. 
Once nutrients enter the water system, the externalities they create can take years 
to correct.  In some cases, complete bio-systems are destroyed in a few weeks.  The 
Unified National Strategy for Animal Feeding Operations (UNSAFO), written by the 
USDA and EPA, documents that agriculture is the most widespread source of pollution in 
the nation’s surveyed rivers.  Manure nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorus) and potentially 
heavy metals, pathogens, hormones, antibiotics and ammonia, reaching bodies of water, 
are known contributors to the eutrophication4 of water and associated with bacterial 
outbreaks.  Examples of serious water quality impairment have brought many waste 
management issues to the attention of policymakers.  This has resulted in policy changes 
that are the foundation for discussion later in this document.   
One such water quality incident was the cryptosporidium outbreak in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin’s drinking water that sickened more than 400,000 and caused the death of 104 
people.  It was believed that livestock waste was a contributor to the problem.  In 1995, 
one and a half million gallons of raw hog manure contaminated the South Fork of the 
                                                 
4 Eutrophication is when an abundance of nutrients promote excessive algae growth in water.  Rapid algae 
growth depletes the available oxygen in water, creating fish kills and odorous drinking water. 
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Iowa River.  In another instance, 25 million gallons of swine waste overflowed from a 
lagoon in North Carolina.  To put the spill into perspective, that is twice the amount of 
the Exxon-Valdez oil spill (Innes).   
Oklahoma has struggled with its own water quality issues.  Since legislation in 
1991 that paved the way for corporate farms in Oklahoma, the state has seen a 
proliferation in swine production.  From 1991 to 2000, the number of swine in production 
increased from 190,000 to approximately 2.26 million (OWRB).  Many of these 
operations are located in northwestern Oklahoma alongside cattle feedlots and pose a 
contamination risk to underground water supplies such as the Ogallala aquifer.  If high 
levels of nitrates contaminate the water, the entire water supply can be deemed unsafe to 
drink (Lazo et al.). 
Likewise, many scenic rivers in eastern Oklahoma do not meet water quality 
standards due to the application of chicken litter to surrounding agricultural land.  For 
example, the eutrophication of Lakes Eucha and Spavinaw in eastern Oklahoma has been 
blamed on the over-application of chicken litter to land in the watershed.  This forces the 
City of Tulsa to use expensive water treatment practices to remove the bad taste and meet 
water quality requirements (Ancev, Stoecker, and Storm).  Currently, poultry producers 
are anticipating action from the Oklahoma attorney general that could further restrict or 
prohibit the application of all poultry manure (Previch).  In the next section, the 
researcher discusses the industrial changes influencing the waste management dilemma. 
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Industrialization and the Influence on Policy 
As part of American agriculture’s industrialization, the past 30 years have brought 
about remarkable changes in the demographics and structure of animal agriculture.  What 
was once a diverse industry, characterized by small numbers of numerous types of 
livestock, has become specific operations specializing in the production of thousands of 
animals (Bottomline Statistics).  As animal numbers have increased at facilities, 
production cost advantages have increased due to the specialization and repetition of 
tasks (Norris and Thurow).   
Facilities have migrated to a regional location specific to one industry to take 
advantage of feed sources, climatic conditions, corporate incentives and proximity to 
market outlets.  For example, 80% of the cattle raised in feedlots are concentrated in 
Texas, Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado; broilers are largely produced in the South, 
specifically Arkansas, Alabama, and Georgia; the swine industry has been primarily in 
the Midwest until the proliferation of operations in North Carolina and to a lesser degree 
Oklahoma (Bottomline Statistics).   
Collectively, animal agriculture has changed from a land-based activity to a 
specialized capital-intensive activity focused on profit maximization and cost 
minimization (Abdalla, Lanyon, and Hallberg).  The trend toward consolidation, vertical 
integration, and geographic concentration began with the poultry industry in the 1960s 
and 1970s.  Similarly, from 1966 to 1996, the number of swine operations dropped from 
one million to less than 160,000 while the number of animals remained at approximately 
57 million.  Further, in 1996, fewer than 5,000 swine operations accounted for more than 
50% of the entire nation’s swine production (Bottomline Statistics).   
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These changes in the swine industry over the past twenty years have not gone 
unnoticed by the public and policymakers.  Concerns about large hog operations, 
including environmental degradation, offensive odors, and economic displacement from a 
relocating industry are greater than those for previous developments in other animal 
sectors.  This public awareness has raised the visibility of issues, increased the intensity 
of public debate, and generated pressures for policy change applicable to all livestock 
operations.  After discussing industry changes over the previous 40 years, the next 
discussion explains how regulations and policy may influence future industry changes. 
 
Manure Management Regulations 
The Clean Water Act of 1972 serves as the centerpiece for water quality 
protection.  Since implementation, the EPA has been regulating animal feeding 
operations.  Despite efforts to curb pollution, contamination of water from nitrogen and 
phosphorus remains to be a major problem and the primary reason for regulations.  A 
large percentage of the livestock industry’s transition did not occur until after the Clean 
Water Act, thus many rules were not written with consideration for the structural changes 
that have taken place in the industry.  Since that time, the industry has become a 
collection of large, geographically concentrated operations.  As a result, manure 
pollutants have received greater attention from state and federal agencies.  This has 
brought about numerous instruments, policies, and regulations addressing unforeseen 
problems in the original Clean Water Act.  
In 1999, the UNSAFO cited growing environmental and public health issues and 
the need to address them.  The UNSAFO identifies seven strategic issues to be addressed 
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to improve issues related to animal feeding operations.  They are (1) fostering CNMP 
(Comprehensive Nutrient Management Plan) development and implementation; (2) 
accelerating voluntary, incentive-based programs; (3) implementing and improving the 
existing regulatory program; (4) coordinating research, technical innovation, compliance 
assistance, and technology transfer; (5) encouraging industry leadership; (6) increasing 
data coordination; and (7) establishing better performance measures and greater 
accountability (Federal Register). 
As part of the Strategy’s objective to reduce water pollution from AFOs, the 
USDA and EPA encouraged all animal feeding operations to develop CNMPs.  The plans 
should address feed management, manure handling and storage, land application of 
manure, land management, record keeping, and management of other utilization options.  
Additionally, the CNMPs should identify a plan to implement the management practices 
and be specific to the location and goals of the operation and producer (USDA, USEPA).  
Despite the recommendations, few producers went forward and implemented the plans 
due to the costs associated with developing a plan. 
These recommendations were in foresight to a planned reform of the Clean Water 
Act.  In 2003, the EPA unveiled rules in the Clean Water Act requiring all CAFOs to 
meet nutrient application standards as defined in a CNMP and acquire a NPDES 
(National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System) permit (Ribaudo et al.).  This focuses 
on making sure that manure application is consistent with crop uptake.  Under these 
plans, producers are expected to make a number of manure management improvements 
that can increase production costs.  The Unified National Strategy suggests that producers 
modify animal diets to reduce unused nutrients in the manure; manure handling should 
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prevent water pollution and consider odor and other environmental problems; manure 
should be managed to prevent nutrient loss to the atmosphere; producers should keep 
detailed records of the quantity of manure produced and where, when, and how many 
nutrients are applied to a field; records should also include soil and manure testing; and 
movement of organic materials, nutrients, and pathogens should be minimized by buffer 
strips to utilize nutrients or other undesired amenities moving from the application site 
(USDA, USEPA).  The magnitude of these requirements creates incredible costs.  In the 
EPA’s final rule on CAFOs (hereafter CAFO rule), they estimated that these regulations 
would cost CAFOs $283 million dollars a year.  In addition, more than 285 CAFOs may 
be susceptible to facility closure due to their limited access to land needed for proper 
manure disposal (Federal Register).   
The major logistical problem this creates for many producers is the possibility of 
land constraints to adequately spread manure.  With the CAFO rule, the EPA is requiring 
large CAFOs to determine the potential for nitrogen and phosphorus loss on all fields that 
will receive manure, litter, or lagoon effluent (Sheffield and Paschold).  Law requires that 
a soil assessment be determined before manure is applied to a field.  The level of 
nutrients already present in the soil then determines how producers are allowed to spread 
the manure.  Historically, livestock producers have applied manure to crops on a nitrogen 
basis.  This means that manure can be applied at a rate to satisfy nitrogen requirements 
for the crop.  However, the problem arises that animal manure contains an excessive 
amount of phosphorus when manure is applied on nitrogen basis.  In general, crops 
require only one part of phosphorus to about eight parts of nitrogen (Zhang, Johnson, and 
Raun).  Thus, as producers apply manure on a nitrogen basis, phosphorus is being over-
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applied resulting in phosphorus loading of the soils and subsequent erosion of phosphorus 
rich soil particles into freshwater supplies.   
This scenario damages the quality of upstream and fresh waters.  In waters such 
as those common to Oklahoma, phosphorus is the limiting nutrient, and when phosphorus 
leaches into water with abundant nitrogen, a proliferation of microorganism growth 
occurs resulting in eutrophication (Norwood and Chvosta).  As a result, this CAFO rule 
places a larger emphasis on phosphorus-based plans for large CAFOs.  To assist 
producers, enforcement officials, and development professionals, a phosphorus index has 
been developed to asses the potential for nitrogen and phosphorus movement under 
different land characteristics and management practices.  The index tool identifies areas 
that may exhibit a greater risk for phosphorus movement, relative to other sites.  The 
index is based on eight characteristics that aid a producer in assigning a numerical value 
to each of the characteristics.  The characteristics include factors for soil erosion, 
irrigation erosion, soil runoff class, soil test phosphorus, rate of commercial fertilizer 
application, method of commercial fertilizer application, rate of manure phosphorus 
application, and method of manure phosphorus application.  After determining a site 
rating, one can assess the possibility of any adverse phosphorus impact to water 
resources.  On lands where the phosphorus index rating is determined to be low or 
medium, manure may be applied on a nitrogen-based application as discussed previously.  
For lands considered high to very high risks, manure must be applied under a 
phosphorus-based plan or not at all (NRCS).   
When phosphorus-based applications are implemented, these production 
restrictions become a greater issue to producers by forcing many to seek off-farm acres 
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for manure disposal.  For instance, consider moving from a nitrogen-based plan to a 
phosphorus-based plan.  The effective land base required to spread manure could increase 
by eight, because instead of applying eight units of manure to a crop, one can only apply 
one unit5.  Consider a study by Norwood, Massey, and Zhang revealing that 40% of 
Oklahoma surveyed swine producers were already land constrained prior to the 
implementation of the CAFO rule.  Farm level analysis of hog and dairy CAFOs suggests 
that production costs could increase by two under a phosphorus-based standard.  As 
phosphorus-based standards become practice, many producers must seek off-farm acres 
to comply.  Thus, operations forced to export manure will face the largest compliance 
costs of regulations.  To estimate these costs, the crop producers’ willingness-to-pay must 
be defined.  The next section identifies the components needed to identify the WTP of 
livestock producers and examples of inadequate research on the topic. 
 
Willingness-to-Pay: The Missing Link in Compliance Costs 
Complying with the CAFO rule requires CAFOs to spread their manure over a 
much larger land base than they are using, and most will need to move manure off the 
farm.  Although these regulations only focus on CAFOs, they make up about 5% of 
animal feeding operations, contain 50% of all animals, and produce over 65% of the 
excess nutrients (Ribaudo et al.).  For many operations, the impacts of these regulations 
could reduce profits.  Therefore, it is imperative that a cost assessment can be determined 
for this large group of producers.   
                                                 
5 Recall that earlier Zhang, Johnson, and Raun noted the nitrogen – phosphorus ratio required by most 
crops is eight – one. 
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Estimating these costs requires assumptions surrounding farm types, nutrients 
generated in manure, transportation costs, cropland surrounding the farm, and the 
willingness of surrounding crop producers to accept manure.  Numerous studies focus on 
estimating compliance costs for livestock operations, but none focus on the willingness-
to-pay of crop producers for manure.  Ribaudo et al. note that livestock and poultry 
farms’ annual net income could decline by more than one billion dollars, but the precise 
outcome depends greatly on the extent to which cropland operators are willing to 
substitute manure for commercial fertilizer.  As more cropland operators are willing to 
take manure, the net costs of hauling manure decrease.  In their study, they analyze the 
regional impact for animal feeding operations.  For CAFOs in Oklahoma, the net cost per 
animal unit under a nitrogen standard regardless of crop producer acceptance rates.  
However, a phosphorus standard finds that net costs per animal unit per year can be as 
high as $27 when only 10% of producers will accept manure.  This falls to approximately 
$10 if 80% of producers are accepting (Ribaudo et al.).  The problem that this study fails 
to address is that costs of $10 per animal unit may be manageable, whereas $27 per 
animal unit could force an operation to cut production entirely.  Because a specific level 
of acceptance for crop producers is not identified, an accurate estimate of compliance 
cost is still unattainable.   
Other studies by Metcalfe et al. and Glewen and Koelsch attempt to gather 
information about the prices livestock producers receive for applying manure on crops.  
Both studies identify transactions where livestock producers receive compensation for the 
manure, but because of the relatively small sample sizes, what little information the 
studies did reveal could not be statistically validated.   
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Another study by Feinerman, Bosch, and Pease exhibited a deficiency in 
acceptance rates.  They attempted to determine the value of manure based on the cost to 
apply, handle, and transport the manure to cropland.  However, if transport cost is 
dependent on the distance manure must be hauled, one cannot estimate the compliance 
cost to an operation without speculating on the acceptance of local crop producers. 
These deficiencies in crop producers’ acceptance rates is evidence of the need to 
determine crop producers’ willingness-to-pay6 for livestock manure.  By determining the 
value at which producers will accept manure, the researcher can provide more accurate 
compliance costs estimates.  Therefore, the general objective of the study is to reveal 
information leading to the reduction of animal feeding operations’ compliance costs from 
waste management regulations requiring off-farm exportation of manure.  Specifically, 
the study will seek to satisfy two objectives: (1) Determine the correlation of crop 
producers’ willingness-to-pay with manure attributes and producer demographics, and (2) 
Identify the willingness-to-pay distribution of Oklahoma crop producers.   
With this information, one can better estimate the land availability to livestock 
producers by determining crop producers’ preferential characteristics of manure products.  
Not only will a producer be better informed about the potential costs and land availability 
for application, but a livestock producer may also adapt his or her products to consumer 
demands to encourage the adoption of manure fertilizers.  Additionally, this information 
will be useful to policymakers in achieving the objectives of the Clean Water Act 
revisions and the Unified National Strategy by designing policy that fosters the 
movement of manure from areas of higher to lower concentration.   
                                                 
6 Willingness-to-pay allows the researcher to measure the value of manure to a crop producer.  One can 
then interpret willingness-to-accept manure as the percent of producers willing-to-pay $0. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
The federal government has regulated waste discharged from confined animal 
feeding operations (CAFOs) since 1972.  Research about manure management issues has 
expanded considerably to address this continually growing problem.  When the Clean 
Water Act’s National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program 
designated farms with 1,000 or more animal units (CAFOs) as “point sources” of 
pollution (Ogishi, Metcalfe, and Zilberman), the move prompted agricultural extension 
specialists and academics to provide policymakers, livestock and poultry producers, and 
other agriculturalists with information highlighting the concerns of animal waste in the 
environment.  Although manure management received attention at a national level, the 
general public did not become informed until the last ten years about the environmental 
amenities that many agricultural practices threaten.  As a result, agriculture has witnessed 
increased public scrutiny and regulatory actions attempting to increase environmental 
quality.   
The policy greatly impacting the agricultural industry is the Clean Water Act 
revisions implemented in 2003.  The potential consequences that these regulations could 
create in the meat production industry have motivated numerous studies to determine the 
effects to the agricultural industry.  These regulations could force many livestock 
producers to greatly increase the land area on which they apply animal manure.  This may 
force many livestock producers to seek off-farm acres and obtain crop producers’ 
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permission to spread animal waste.  For many livestock operations, the willingness-to-
pay (WTP) of crop producers for livestock manure will largely determine the cost of 
compliance.  If livestock producers can establish a viable market for manure, this will aid 
producers in countering the costs incurred to bring facilities within compliance.  As a 
result, this study seeks to determine demand for swine and poultry manure by eliciting 
crop producers’ WTP.  The remainder of this chapter consists of two sections.  The first 
includes two parts discussing previous policy ineffectiveness and the absence of specific 
compliance cost estimates for livestock producers implementing nutrient management 
plans.  The second section focuses on non-market valuation procedures, particularly 
contingent valuation.  A theoretical discussion of the valuation method and corrective 
procedures to increase reliability of the contingent valuation estimation procedure is 
included. 
 
Policy Design Failures 
Many critics of manure management policy argue that regulations including the 
NPDES program are ineffective in preserving water quality because only a fraction of all 
animal feeding operations are regulated (those being mostly CAFOs).  With the rule, the 
Environmental Protection Agency encourages state agencies to use voluntary and 
incentive programs to help medium and small sized operations prevent actions that would 
subject them to the rule (Goan).  Norris and Batie, citing a survey of waste management 
facilities in North Carolina, indicate that smaller, older swine operations that fall outside 
federal regulation are more likely to be repetitive sources of pollution that large CAFOs.   
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One reason for failed policy is the lack of enforcement officials and a specific 
regulating agency.  Many local and state agencies responsible for setting standards and 
regulations do not have the legal power to pursue violations (Mullen and Centner).  
Because lame-duck jurisdiction leaves many organizations incapacitated to act, 
disciplinary action must be carried out by a more authoritative agency that understands 
less about the problem and may be unwilling to pursue litigation.  Mullen and Centner 
continue to note that production operations will seek to minimize their costs.  Therefore, 
many livestock operations consider the risks between regulatory compliance and the 
potential penalties if cited for violations.  Increasing the number of regulated firms has 
little beneficial impact on the environment if facilities continue to escape compliance due 
to a short supply of enforcement officials.  In fact, because of incredibly high compliance 
costs, it may be cheaper for a firm to prolong the time between compliance and avoid the 
high costs in exchange for the risk of being cited for violations.  Moreover, past 
precedents by enforcing agencies suggests that consequences from violations may be 
minimal given that agencies are likely deficient in definition, personnel, and funding to 
inclusively pursue all violators (Mullen and Centner). 
Norris and Thurow cite several instances where regulation does not achieve its 
designed purpose.  The responsibility of administering CAFO permits has been assigned 
to many state environmental agencies.  Yet, the interpretation of CAFO permissibility for 
each state allows for a lack of uniformity across state lines and creates even greater 
difficulty when disputes involve multiple states.  One such case is the expensive water 
treatment practices implemented by the City of Tulsa.  Livestock facilities in both 
Arkansas and Oklahoma contribute to the eutrophication of the Eucha-Spavinaw 
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watershed and the subsequent expensive water treatment practices (Ancev, Stoecker, and 
Storm).  However, the lack of a universal policy severely inhibits the City of Tulsa’s 
ability to hold Arkansas producers liable for increased processing costs to remove odors.   
An example of these problems is an account of filed complaints in the State of 
Oklahoma about pollution problems at livestock facilities.  During a four-year period, 
285 complaints were filed, and only 20 of those complaints were ruled upon.  15 were 
ruled to not be violations of the law and only five were proven to be violations (Frey, 
Hopper, and Fredregill).  Therefore, the other 265 complaints went unresolved, leaving 
one to believe that no corrective action was taken in response to the complaints.  This is a 
clear indication of the perplexity regulators, agricultural producers, and citizens face to 
reach common ground that satisfies the public, is easy for regulators to enforce, and 
leaves producers with realistic regulations.   
Policy instruments may commonly send the wrong signals to policymakers.  
Currently, water quality is the only legal tool that allows for enforceable action under 
federal law (Norris and Batie).  As a result, neighbors disgruntled with CAFOs or other 
nuisances such as odor or flies cite water quality issues as a means for legal action.  Thus, 
attempts by policy or production operations to correct the cited problem may be in 
response to the wrong stimuli, because the underlying nuisance bringing about the legal 
suit may not be easily measured (i.e. odor, flies, loss of property value, etc.) (Norris and 
Thurow).   
Regulations written prior to agriculture’s large industrialization movement are 
another problem often cited.  In many cases, the organizational structure and the common 
practices of contracting, geographical consolidation of feeding operations, and the 
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concentration of manure nutrients were not considered when policy tools were originally 
designed (Ogishi, Metcalfe, and Zilberman).  This allows many gaps and loopholes in the 
regulations.  For example, political motivation to protect small “family farms” allows 
many operations to avoid regulatory compliance when in fact they too, in an aggregate 
sense, significantly affect environmental quality despite low production levels (Ogishi, 
Metcalfe and Zilberman).  As a result, these regulatory deficiencies allow unregulated 
producers to employ insufficient waste management practices in regard to federal 
regulation. 
Innes argues that regulating observable producer choices would allow the 
government to induce producer behavior that accounts for its environmental externalities.  
By using economic theory and market forces, policy can provide the proper incentives for 
operations to follow government regulatory objectives and policies.  Regulated 
production decisions could include regulating a maximum number of animal units per 
acre of land, stricter specifications for which lagoons must comply to protect against 
storm overflows, or encouraging more regional concentration of facilities to decrease the 
potential of widespread pollution and make producers’ practices more assessable to 
regulators (Innes).  Ogishi, Metcalfe, and Zilberman suggest establishing marketable 
permits for producing animals or, more directly, pollution permits similar to the 
manufacturing industries’ permits to pollute. 
Waste management and pollution issues are abundant.  Prior to the concentration 
of production facilities, many of the issues were of little concern primarily because they 
were less observed by society.  As livestock and poultry industries have transformed and 
consolidated, numerous problems have emerged and/or become magnified under 
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society’s watchful eye.  Public relation catastrophes such as the lagoon spill in North 
Carolina that dumped 25 million gallons of hog waste into the New River and the 
potential link between dairy manure runoff and the Milwaukee cryptosporidium outbreak 
in drinking water that sickened more than 400,000 and killed 104 people has done 
nothing to reduce public scrutiny (Innes).  Because of these and other events, policy and 
regulation are attempting to improve agriculture’s practices and decrease some of the 
social costs linked to livestock production. 
 
Clean Water Act Regulations 
In a continuing effort to address these issues and many others, rules in the Clean 
Water Act, defined by the EPA in 2003, require concentrated animal feeding operations 
to meet nutrient application standards as defined in a nutrient management plan (Ribaudo 
et al.).  The Unified National Strategy for Animal Feeding Operations strongly 
encourages each animal feeding operation to “develop and implement a technically 
sound, economically feasible, and site-specific” comprehensive nutrient management 
plan (CNMP) for properly managing manure produced at the facility (CAFOs are 
required to develop a CNMP by law) (USDA, USEPA).   
For many producers, animals at the facility produce more manure nutrients than 
can be applied to the surrounding land without accumulating excess manure nutrients in 
the soil (Kellogg et al.).  Under the requirements of the nutrient management plans, many 
larger livestock operations do not have adequate land access to spread their manure 
within compliance limits.  A study by Kellogg et al. found that in 1997, of the 11,242 
potential CAFOs, 2,603 operations had no acres of pastureland or the 24 crops identified 
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in the study on which to spread manure.  This implies that nearly one-fourth of the CAFO 
operations will have to rely solely on manure exportation.  Of these without any land for 
spreading, 41% was made up of poultry and 38% of swine operations (Figure 2.).  Thus, 
swine and poultry industries may be the hardest hit with compliance costs.  Because these 
operations and many others realize restricted land access, many livestock operations must 
seek out land under the control or ownership of crop producers to apply within specific 
rates determined by the livestock operations’ CNMP.  More alarming to livestock 
producers facing regulations is a study by Ribaudo, Cattaneo, and Agapoff.  They note 
that the acreage required by swine CAFOs under a phosphorus-based spreading strategy 
in Colorado, Oklahoma, and Utah would far exceed the available land area. 
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Figure 2.  Industry Percent of All CAFOs without Crop or Pastureland 
Source: Ribaudo et al., 1997 data. 
 
Excess manure nutrients create many problems for producers.  The primary 
problem is that exporting excess manure from their facility creates additional costs.  
Many other factors influence the potential costs.  Ribaudo notes that complying 
operations incur added costs for developing a CNMP: testing manure for nutrients, 
hauling manure longer distances, and applying manure to more land.  However, one 
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should note that CAFOs are already required by law to have a CNMP (Ribaudo et al.).  
Therefore, the largest compliance cost to be felt throughout the industry is expected to be 
the cost of seeking additional land and the resulting manure application costs. 
As Fleming, Babcock, and Wang found, the distance manure must be hauled and 
its nutrient content are the two most important factors affecting the potential benefits to 
crop production.  They found that commercial fertilizer cost savings were most 
significant when manure storage systems promoted maximizing the manure nutrients 
retained (i.e. anaerobic lagoons promote the release of nitrogen into the atmosphere along 
with other gases).  Thus, manure treated under an anaerobic lagoon system resulted in 
off-site transportation costs exceeding the nutrient value of the manure due to its lack of 
nitrogen.  One should note that the majority of Oklahoma swine operations operate 
anaerobic lagoon systems.  For many producers, this may be a disadvantage due to the 
decreased ratio of nitrogen to phosphorus.   
One overriding concern that Fleming, Babcock and Wang note is that despite the 
manure management control options, such as phosphorus-based application versus 
nitrogen-based, incorporation versus surface application, or storage/nutrient conservation 
decisions, production decisions in the swine industry are solely driven by the market 
value of the hog.  However, because regulations threaten the financial stability of some 
operations, traditional decision rationale may need to be altered to increase environmental 
quality and decrease nutrient runoff and contamination. 
Feinerman, Bosch, and Pease note several obstacles manure must overcome 
before it becomes a widespread commercial fertilizer substitute.  For manure to become 
more competitive with commercial fertilizer, the nitrogen to phosphorus ratio must be 
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increased to a level that better meets the nutrient requirements of crops.  They further 
note that farmers’ acceptance of manure will depend on the manure’s relative cost to 
commercial fertilizer.  As spreading livestock manure falls under greater regulation, 
producer demand may decrease because additional transaction costs incurred by a 
producer to understand and follow regulations do not offset the economic benefits.  The 
next section discusses the absence of these cost estimates and the need to identify them. 
 
Regulated Livestock Producers Lack Specific Compliance Estimates 
The Clean Water Act’s regulations are forcing many livestock operations to 
become compliant for the first time.  For many, the impacts of the regulations could 
decrease an operation’s financial stability.  A joint report by the Economic Research 
Service and United States Department of Agriculture, discussing costs to AFOs applying 
manure, indicates that if manure acceptance by crop producers remains at low levels 
(approximately 20%), production across all animal feeding operations could decline by as 
much as 27% in broilers, 12% in fed beef, and 6% in pork (Ribaudo et al.).  Similarly, 
evidence from Kaplan, Johansson, and Peters suggests regulations on manure nutrients 
will reduce livestock production and subsequently increase meat product prices. 
Because of the potentially large effects to both producers and industry, Ribaudo et 
al. attempts to more thoroughly estimate the impacts of the Clean Water Act regulations 
by shedding light on manure distribution and management costs.  However, the report 
fails to measure the percentage of producers willing to accept manure.  Instead, the report 
hypothetically analyzes the impacts of varying producer acceptance rates.  Thus, the true 
estimated compliance costs to livestock producers remain unquantifiable because little 
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has been revealed about the crop producers’ actual manure purchasing behaviors.  Absent 
these integral components of research, determining the distance that a producer can 
expect to haul manure and the compensation that she could receive is reduced to a best 
guess estimation.  Therefore, the absence of specific cost estimates provides little 
information to the livestock producer. 
One reason for the lack of precision is that many assumptions must be made about 
crop and livestock producers’ behaviors.  Ribaudo states in a USDA-ERS publication that 
the total compliance cost to an average swine operation in the mid-Atlantic region with 
more than 2,500 animals could range from $1,450 to $32,500 per year depending on the 
willingness of local landowners to accept manure.  Livestock operators likely to see the 
greatest increase in cost are those forced to seek off-farm acres to effectively remove the 
manure from their operation.  Although helpful, providing a cost estimation with a 
variance this large does little to help management pinpoint costs and determine the 
appropriate management decisions. 
For livestock producers to have a better estimate of compliance costs, the 
willingness of local crop producers to accept manure must be determined.  One study 
determining the opportunity for feeding operations to remove manure is a manure 
marketing survey conducted by Glewen and Koelsch in 1998 on 210 Nebraska feedlots.  
The survey asks feedlot owners to disclose their financial arrangements for manure 
removal.  Feedlots with 1,000 or fewer animal units generally have adequate land to 
apply manure under both nitrogen and phosphorus plans.  Medium sized farms (between 
1,000 and 10,000 animal units) have enough land to only use all of the nitrogen nutrients.  
However, the largest feedlots lack adequate land to completely use all of the nitrogen or 
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phosphorus nutrients.  Of the largest feedlots, 80% indicated they exported manure 
(Glewen and Koelsch).   
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Figure 3.  Categorical Percent of Feedlots Exporting Manure 
Source: Glewen and Koelsch.  “Marketing Manure” 
 
A commonality discovered between all manure exporters, despite operation size, 
was their animal density exceeded 30 animal units per acre of cropland.  Maybe more 
indicative of the situation is the fact that producers who did not have to export manure 
average only seven animal units per acre of cropland (Glewen and Koelsch).  Smaller 
operations are more likely to maintain a lower animal density, and therefore rely less on 
manure export as a means to remove manure nutrients.   
Producers indicate that the most common financial arrangement for a feedlot’s 
manure removal is to give manure away at no charge (54%) (Glewen and Koelsch).  An 
important observation from this survey is that often the livestock operator is responsible 
for the transportation of manure.  This may indicate that the livestock producer will be 
disadvantaged when negotiating a price.  Crop producers realize the limitations of 
livestock operations and are less flexible in negotiations.  Another downfall contrary to 
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the benefits of organic material and crop nutrients in manure are crop producers’ focus on 
the potential for soil pathogens, the lack of uniformity in nutrient content, variation in 
application rate, soil compaction, and the lengthened release time for nitrogen in manure 
when compared to chemical fertilizer (Wortmann). 
Few producers realize the marketing potential of manure as a fertilizer alternative.  
Research suggests that livestock producers may underestimate the value of their manure.  
Glewen and Koelsch found that more than 30% of feedlots receive a price exceeding $0 
for manure application.  Metcalfe et al. reveals somewhat contrasting indicators in a late 
1990s study that evaluates the production practices of Oklahoma swine producers and 
federal regulation affecting them.  The survey of the swine producers finds that over-
application of manure is often attributed to two factors: land access constraints and 
manure transportation costs.  As operations have grown in size, the cropland retained by 
the operations has not increased proportionately.  Thus, manure production increases, 
costs of handling manure begin to exceed the economical benefit of application, and the 
nutrients become concentrated in one area leading to potential runoff. 
Many producers also struggle to receive compensation for their manure.  This is 
evident in a study by Metcalfe et al.  Seven survey respondents acquired permanent 
manure application easements on others’ land or developed long-term contracts with 
other landowners for manure application.  Though two respondents had contractual 
arrangements for a price greater than $0, the small sample size limits the strength of any 
statistical conclusions revealing crop producers’ demand for livestock manure.   
Nunez and McCann conducted a study about Missouri and Iowa crop producers to 
determine what factors influenced an individual’s willingness to use manure.  The study 
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identifies the factors significantly influencing acceptance of manure to be profitability, 
age, location, uncertainty, and awareness.  As the profitability increases and uncertainty 
about the manure’s effect on the land relative to commercial fertilizer decreases, 
producers’ willingness to use manure increases.  The study also indicates that farm 
systems determine producers’ likelihood of acceptance, suggesting some production 
systems are better suited to utilize manure applications.  Nonetheless, this study, as well 
as others previously mentioned, is deficient in one area.  It fails to place a monetary value 
on livestock producers’ manure.  As indicated, this information is imperative for the 
livestock producer to understand her fiscal situation.   
Determining monetary value for manure by estimating crop producers’ 
willingness-to-pay requires the use of non-market valuation methods.  Previous studies 
have employed traditional valuation procedures, but revealed little about the potential 
detriment to producers facing governmental regulation.  As a result, this study determines 
manure value by means of non-market valuation estimators in a random utility 
framework, using survey responses from Oklahoma crop producers to determine the 
likelihood that a crop producer would pay a specific price for manure.  Subsequently, a 
discussion follows about the emergence of non-market valuation estimators and their 
general applicability to economic problems.  More specifically, contingent valuation is 
introduced for its flexibility in assessing economic value in hypothetical markets.   
 
Non-Market Valuation Tools 
A fundamental concept of economics is the determination of value.  By 
discovering value for individuals, utility functions can provide insight about the specific 
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attributes that determine value and aid in constructing inverse compensated demand 
curves (Lusk and Hudson).  As a result, the fundamentals of valuation are nearly as old as 
economics.  Throughout history, two practices have emerged to determine value: market-
based approaches (also known as revealed preferences) and non-market-based valuation 
approaches (commonly referred to as stated preferences) (Elliott, Reed, and Franklin).  
These two methods are widely used in the determination of value.  However, until the last 
half-century, only market-based valuation existed. 
Prior to the emergence of non-market valuation procedures, researchers and 
economists had few options to estimate the effects of policy and economic stimuli.  
Traditionally, market based approaches have been excellent tools for estimating the 
values of goods and services in which some type of market transaction could be 
observed.  The three most commonly applied market-based approaches are the cost 
approach, the income approach, and the comparison approach (Elliott, Reed, and 
Franklin).  Previous literature in the field of manure management has yielded studies in 
which the cost approach was employed to determine the effects of waste management 
policies.  Feinerman, Bosch, and Pease determined the cost components to apply, handle, 
and transport livestock manure to cropland.  Then, they estimated the potential value of 
manure based on its nutrient content by determining a social welfare benefit from the 
replacement of commercial fertilizer with animal manure and the costs of application.  
This study suggests a positive value should be observed for manure.  However, Glewen 
and Koelsch, observing a limited number of real market transactions, reveal that 54% of 
manure was transacted at the price of $0.  This illustrates a potential weakness in the cost 
approach, as estimates are not representative of real market transactions. 
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Another study by Ribaudo, Cattaneo, and Agapoff estimates the costs of meeting 
nutrient standards imposed by the Clean Water Act’s legislation.  This study employs the 
cost approach and considers cost share components available to producers through the 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program.  Noting the potential of cost share programs 
to influence producers’ decisions, the researchers cite that demand for manure is driven 
by factors besides nutrient content.  The study reveals aggregate cost estimations based 
on speculation about the percentage of producers willing to accept manure.  Though the 
study estimates cost, it fails to analyze the problem on a microeconomic level and 
provide any details about the individual behavior of a crop producer.  Many market-based 
approaches continue to provide insightful information, but deficiencies in traditional 
approaches’ ability to determine the WTP for non-marketed goods and the lack of 
monetary values are subordinate to the capabilities of contingent valuation. 
Similar deficiencies in research resulted in the dawning of non-market valuation 
in the 1960s to assist in placing an economic value on goods and services in which little 
to no observable market existed (Portney).  Many non-market valuation procedures have 
since emerged to value items, such as, environmental attributes, national parks, non-
market tested products, endangered species, sparsely or uncommonly traded goods, etc.  
Throughout this period of advancement, contingent valuation has become the most 
widely used and accepted practice in estimating willingness-to-pay.  The main reasons 
for implementation are its ability to estimate passive use values and provide flexible data 
collection procedures (Carson, Flores, and Meade) 7. 
                                                 
7 Existence or passive use values are described as the utility an individual gains from the knowledge that 
endangered animals, threatened environments, or other unique objects exist. 
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A contingent valuation study most commonly administers surveys or 
questionnaires to individuals ascertaining the monetary value a respondent places on a 
hypothetical product or project.  Further, as the name suggests, values determined using 
this method are conditional upon a specific situation or market that is described within 
the elicitation process (Portney).  For example, consider a telephone interview where an 
individual describes an unfamiliar product to you.  After describing the product, the 
survey administrator then provides a brief description of a hypothetical market and 
attributes specific to the product being sold.  Given this information and calling upon 
your own consumer knowledge, you are then asked to provide your monetary value of the 
product.  In other words, how much would you pay to own this product?  This procedural 
aspect of questioning respondents about products that have not been previously assigned 
values in a market is the component of contingent valuation that has been widely 
criticized.  Many opponents have demonstrated widely varying estimates dependent on 
the context in which the theoretical market is established.  In defense of the contingent 
valuation method, Alan Randall made the following statement in 1986. 
“… the goods offered in contingent markets are not always 
familiar, and individuals may not associate these particular 
goods with trading possibilities.  Nevertheless, unfamiliar 
goods are often introduced in “real” markets and, 
especially, in market experiments.  So the distinction 
between ‘real’ and contingent markets is, if anything, a 
matter of degree.” 
 
Thus, the controversy surrounding contingent valuation is as much a philosophical 
argument as a methodological one.  Nonetheless, controversy and criticism continues to 
drive methodological improvements implementing corrective procedures and producing 
more reliable valuations. 
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Originally, contingent valuation had its roots in public sector economics 
determining the values of environmental and natural resources.  Portney notes that 
(Robert) Davis first implemented the idea of contingent valuation by surveying hunters 
and wilderness lovers about their value of a specific recreational area.  However, 
contingent valuation’s monumental emergence began with John Krutilla’s “Conservation 
Reconsidered,” where he suggested that this procedure could estimate the existence value 
to individuals (Portney).  The ability of contingent valuation to measure existence value 
has accelerated its use, yet has been the central component of controversy and criticism 
surrounding its application in economics.  Advocates of contingent valuation argue that 
without the inclusion of passive use values, studies reveal little to no measurable 
economic value for public goods.  Conversely, proponents argue that existence values are 
the source of gross overestimations of a good’s economic value.  This characteristic of 
overestimating value is referred to as hypothetical bias and has been contingent 
valuation’s largest source of controversy.   
Hypothetical bias is a phenomenon that arises when subjects are questioned about 
their willingness-to-pay for a hypothetical good.  Respondents tend to overestimate their 
true value of a good.  Champ and Bishop describe the source of bias as respondents who 
have positive feelings toward a project or good but do not actually purchase in a real 
market.  As a result, a second area of debate involves the theoretical qualifications that a 
contingent valuation study should satisfy.  Researchers now suggest that to ensure 
unbiased value calculations, estimates should follow basic demand theory in terms of 
price sensitivity, comparing estimates using alternative procedures, and satisfying scope 
tests, where consumers recognize and pay a difference for greater quality (Carson). 
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Prior to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, researchers and economic analysts were using 
contingent valuation with relatively little standardization among practices.  However, 
when the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (in response to the spill) prompted action to prevent 
future oil spills and damage assessment procedures, contingent valuation was placed in 
the center of a heated debate.  To this point, few environmental court proceedings 
involving contingent valuation possessed the visibility and widespread economic impacts 
felt by fisherman, resort owners, and the general public hurt by the spill (Portney).  At the 
time, casual practices of contingent valuation could have generated existence value 
reparations for Exxon Valdez far exceeding any realistic monetary figure.  As a result, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) appointed a panel of non-
market valuation authorities to determine whether existence values derived from 
contingent valuation were “reliable” measures of damage assessment.  The ensuing report 
published by the panel in 1993 generated numerous recommendations and guidelines to 
decrease the wide disparity among contingent valuation studies.  The panel described past 
methods as “casual” and identified a serious need for reform.   
The greatest problem with contingent valuation is the tendency to overestimate 
the WTP of surveyed individuals in a theoretical market.  As previously mentioned, 
hypothetical bias is a product of numerous problems that severely limit the reliability of 
any test.  As a result, the panel identified several problems that required attention: (1) 
contingent valuation methods may generate results contrary to rational producer choices, 
(2) individuals fail to realize the potential income reduction, making a decision to donate 
based only on the consideration of one project and not if all public programs were funded 
similarly, (3) a majority of previous studies have failed to remind respondents of their 
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own personal budget constraints, (4) thoroughly explaining a policy or program for a 
respondent to make an informed decision is very difficult, (5) market boundaries can 
significantly influence the estimates, and (6) respondents may indicate a greater WTP 
because they feel as if they are contributing to a good cause rather than in support of a 
specific program (also known as the “Warm Glow Effect”).  
 
Survey Design 
NOAA’s report has since served as a benchmark for contingent valuation studies.  
As a result, an abundance of literature exists that greatly expands the evidence behind 
contingent valuation criticisms and corrective elicitation procedures.  Carson et al. 
indicate that contingent valuation mechanisms that produce questionable results, often 
fail because the administrator fails to clearly explain the good, the provision mechanism, 
or the payment vehicle.  In response to these concerns, List and Gallet conduct a meta-
analysis of previous studies to better understand the influence that survey design 
characteristics have on hypothetical bias.  Evidence indicates that mechanisms and 
numerous tools used for eliciting value are responsible for disparity observed between 
stated and actual preferences.  Therefore, it is imperative that survey designers employ a 
standard procedure to elicit unbiased estimates. 
In reaction, numerous studies have outlined the necessary components to ensure 
an unbiased survey.  Collectively, research suggests (1) an introductory section that 
provides background information for the respondent that identifies a context in which the 
market exists, (2) a detailed description of the product being considered, (3) details of the 
transaction, including payment mechanism, (4) potential consequences of the 
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program/project, (5) a reminder about the individual’s budget constraint, (6) information 
gathering attitudinal and demographic characteristics, (7) and one or more follow-up 
questions to ensure that the respondent understood her decision (Carson; Portney; Arrow, 
et al.). 
 
Elicitation Mechanisms 
An article by Lusk and Hudson focused on determining WTP decisions for 
agribusinesses and its usefulness in determining demand components for non-marketed 
goods.  Lusk and Hudson state that choosing the mechanism that aligns the appropriate 
incentives is an important consideration.  Carson et al. characterize the dilemma a 
researcher faces as one of two evils.  They state that the elicitation format a researcher 
employs depends on whether one prefers a format that is unbiased with a large 
confidence interval or a format that may be potentially biased, but with a much tighter 
confidence interval.  As a result, a number of mechanisms exist for eliciting survey 
participants’ value.  One decision affecting the mechanism an individual employs is 
whether the surveyor seeks discrete or continuous values.  Ready, Buzby and Hu cite that 
continuous estimation procedures commonly use two approaches: (1) open-ended 
questions, where respondents state their maximum willingness-to-pay for a product, or 
(2) the payment card approach8, where the individual chooses a WTP from a list of 
printed values.  Alternatively, the study cites that the most common discrete estimation 
procedure is in the form of dichotomous choice questions.  Lusk and Hudson further 
discuss dichotomous choice questions and their appeal in contingent valuation studies.  
                                                 
8 The payment card approach provides respondents with a card containing a range of prices in which they 
are then asked to determine a willingness-to-pay point estimate from the list of values defined by the 
surveyor. 
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Under this mechanism, the survey provides a respondent with a discrete value (i.e. $10, 
$7, $14.06, $3.43) and then asks whether she would be willing to pay the stated price by 
responding “Yes” or “No.”  
Briefly highlighting the differences between continuous and discrete methods, 
Ready, Buzby, and Hu state that continuous procedures generally provide lower 
estimated values and provide more information about an individual’s WTP.  However, 
discrete surveys have become the more widely used practice.  The most popular discrete 
method used is the dichotomous choice question, because it places consumers in a 
situation similar to a grocery purchasing decision.  Though valuation differences have 
been found to exist between continuous and discrete valuation procedures, Ready, Buzby, 
and Hu indicate a study conducted on private goods yielded no significant difference 
between discrete and continuous valuation estimates.  Of the difference between 
continuous and discrete procedures, dichotomous choice methods (discrete procedure) 
yield estimates that are 3.6 to 4.4 times as large as the payment card valuation 
(continuous procedure).   
The NOAA panel also endorses the use of a “referendum” format.  This format 
arranged in the form of a dichotomous choice question asks respondents if they are 
willing to pay the average amount implied by the referendum under question.  The panel 
cites several reasons for choosing this elicitation method over other methods.  The panel 
believes that presenting the choice problem in a broad context allows the respondent to 
arrive at a more realistic and conservative estimate.  Moreover, the panel notes that open-
ended questions lack realism in the context that consumers rarely determine their own 
value for a good.  They believe the open-ended method is more prone to increase the 
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probability of hypothetical bias and data that are erratic and biased.  Despite dichotomous 
choice’s shortcomings, NOAA feels it is most appropriate for assessing economic value. 
Discrete estimators are the most practical and simplistic elicitation procedure.  In 
Lusk and Hudson’s study detailing agribusiness decisions and determining WTP, they 
outline a number of discrete elicitation tools and describe the situations that best use the 
procedure’s concepts. 
One discrete elicitation tool not previously mentioned is the double-bounded 
dichotomous choice question, similar to dichotomous choice but involving an additional 
step.  Double-bounded questions provide the respondent with a second question that is 
contingent on the individual’s first response.  In this case, one survey provides two 
observations of WTP rather than one (Lusk and Hudson).  For example, if an individual 
answers “No” (as in not willing to pay the initial price), a second question is then 
administered where the individual is asked if they would pay a lower stated price.  In the 
same respect, if an individual answers “Yes,” then the second question provides a higher 
price.  Though commonly used to create statistical efficiency, double-bounded questions 
are subject to several problems (Lusk and Hudson).  A study by Cameron and Quiggin 
has shown that the observed WTP values of double-bounded questions are not perfectly 
correlated, bringing into question which observation should be given more statistical 
importance.  Additionally, numerous studies have identified the problem of starting point 
bias associated with this procedure.  Here, an individual’s response to the second 
question is said to depend on the starting value of the first question (Lusk and Hudson).   
Choice-based conjoint analysis is a second mechanism that can be used to derive 
WTP (Lusk and Hudson).  In this framework, the methods ask the individual to determine 
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which product she would prefer, provided a specific set of product attributes or 
circumstances such as price, quality, etc.  One procedural advantage is that it mimics the 
purchase decisions that consumers face (Lusk and Hudson).  Therefore, one would be 
inclined to think that respondents are more likely to portray their true WTP.  Though 
several advantages accompany the mechanism, its design features can be difficult to 
administer and considering product attributes can overwhelm survey respondents into 
making a random selection or abandoning the survey altogether (Lusk and Hudson).   
Another method gaining popularity is the use of experimental auctions.  This 
method designs an auction scenario where a consumer’s bid for a product reflects her 
WTP.  A number of auction alternatives exist to elicit value from market participants, 
such as English or random nth auctions.  Although each procedure creates a different 
level of buyer interaction, Lusk and Hudson state that theoretically the method should 
yield the same value if bids are independently distributed.  However, procedural expenses 
and dependently distributed bids from the lack of participant interest limit auction 
benefits (Lusk and Hudson).  A number of elicitation mechanisms exist, and all will elicit 
product value.  The difficulty lies in selecting the method that will align most 
appropriately with a study’s objectives. 
 
Hypothetical Bias 
Numerous procedural remedies seek to decrease the hypothetical bias of 
contingent valuation and increase its statistical reliability.  Calibration and cheap talk are 
two of the most commonly employed practices to reduce hypothetical bias and provide a 
conservative estimate.  Cheap talk is an ex-ante reminder to the survey respondent of her 
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tendency to overstate values (Lusk).  Alternatively, calibration is a form of ex-post 
reminder, where the respondent is asked to rate the certainty that her stated preference 
matches her WTP in a true market setting (Champ and Bishop).   
Surveys designed with a cheap talk script include an explanatory statement that 
precedes the contingent valuation question informing the respondent about problems with 
hypothetical bias.  The purpose is to directly influence individuals to provide a response 
that more closely resembles actual WTP.  Cummings and Taylor, one of the first to 
utilize the idea of cheap talk, reveal that stated preferences are significantly lower in 
surveys where cheap talk is used.  This leads Cummings and Taylor to conclude that 
cheap talk is successful in eliminating hypothetical bias to the point that hypothetical 
responses are not statistically different from revealed values.  Similarly, Lusk implements 
a cheap talk design in valuing a private good.  Finding that cheap talk has a significant 
affect on reducing hypothetical bias, Lusk explores the correlation between product 
knowledge and WTP.  Lusk finds that individuals familiar with the product being valued 
are not significantly affected by the cheap talk.  However, respondents less familiar with 
the topic are significantly influenced by cheap talk.  He concludes that cheap talk is 
effective at reducing hypothetical bias in respondents unfamiliar with the product being 
valued.  Conversely, Murphy, Stevens, and Weatherhead find that cheap talk does not 
effectively eliminate all hypothetical bias as had been earlier suggested.  They conclude 
that because many respondents have well-formed preferences, cheap talk does not 
influence their level of donation.  Whether cheap talk can eliminate hypothetical bias or 
simply reduce it, studies have proven it yields more accurate valuations. 
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Another strategy to reduce hypothetical bias is calibration.  Calibration attempts 
to measure how certain an individual is that her stated behavior would be the same in a 
real market transaction.  Champ and Bishop find that coding “uncertain” positive 
responses9 to negative responses10 reduces any hypothetical bias to the level that 
estimation results are indistinguishable from actual observations. 
In determining an individual’s certainty, the most common procedure is to 
implement a ten point Likert scale.  Under this scenario, a respondent who indicates that 
she would pay/donate the stated survey amount is asked to circle a number from one to 
ten (1 being very uncertain, and 10 being very certain) to indicate her level of certainty 
that she would indeed make the purchase and pay the stated amount if given the 
opportunity (Champ and Bishop).  Though calibration can effectively reduce hypothetical 
bias, determining the threshold value to recode positive responses to negative responses 
is difficult.  Champ and Bishop note that a hard and fast rule does not exist.  For example, 
Champ et al. find that individuals with a certainty level of ten effectively eliminated 
hypothetical bias for a study conducted about public goods.  Conversely, Champ and 
Bishop identify eight as the appropriate threshold value in a wind power study.  Other 
studies identify that certainty as low as six or seven indicates true behavior.  List and 
Gallet indicate that private goods have lower threshold factors in comparison to public 
goods.  As a result, understanding the advantages of using calibration to reduce 
hypothetical bias is imperative for the researcher, but one must also be aware of the 
difficulties associated with identifying the proper threshold value.  In the final section of 
                                                 
9 A positive response is defined as a respondent who answers “Yes” to a contingent valuation question.  An 
“uncertain” positive respondent is one who answers “Yes,” but has a certainty level below the threshold 
value.   
10 A negative response is defined as a “No” answer to the binary question. 
 41
this chapter, the researcher attempts to identify demand factors for livestock manure and 
their implications on this study. 
 
Demand for Livestock Manure 
Determining the demand for a good is a complex task that requires consideration 
of a number of factors.  In the case of livestock manure, one must realize that crop 
producers are relatively unfamiliar with its use as a fertilizer.  When a product, such as 
manure, is not a widely used and understood, many factors in addition to theoretical 
demand shifters must be considered.  Simplistically, demand is the quantity of a product 
purchased at different prices, ceteris paribus (Cramer, Jensen, and Southgate).  Changes 
in the quantity demanded for a product are dependent on price, but many factors also 
stimulate a change in demand.  These factors include changes in income, changes in 
population, changes in relative prices of substitutes and complements, and changes in 
tastes and preferences.  This known, the researcher seeks to identify what creates both the 
changes in manure demand and what influences price movement for the product.   
Feinerman, Bosch, and Pease conducted a study about the demand for manure 
under different governmental regulatory practices.  This study assumed that the demand 
for manure was elastic depending on its own price, the prices of other competing goods 
(commercial fertilizer), productivity of the soil, nutrient composition of the soil, nutrients 
required by the crop, and regulatory practices affecting application rates.  The agricultural 
industry is witnessing a burgeoning increase in the cost of chemical fertilizer due to rising 
natural gas prices.  As prices continue to increase, the demand for manure as a fertilizer 
substitute is growing and becoming more economical (Burns).  However, as producers 
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seek out sources for manure, many manure attributes discourage and other attributes 
encourage the decision to apply manure to cropland. 
The primary reason for using manure as a substitute is the reduction in 
commercial fertilizer costs.  Burns states that one ton of poultry litter contains $32 to $35 
worth of nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium.  Previous studies by Glewen and Koelsch 
have suggested that crop producers may be able to obtain these nutrients for little to no 
cost.  Though crop producers may have to pay a small price, the idea is that market 
research suggests crop producers are not paying the full nutrient value of manure.   
Ribaudo, Cattaneo, and Agapoff note that demand is more than a function of the 
nutrient value.  One of the benefits manure offers over commercial fertilizer is increased 
organic matter content that improves both physical and biological soil composition.  
Subsequently, water infiltration increases, leading to improved crop yields (Wortmann).  
He notes that manure is more valuable when a nutrient build up is desired in the soil.   
One primary concern about using manure as an alternative is the lack of 
uniformity in the rate of application and manure composition (Wortmann).  Glewen and 
Koelsch conducted a study on services provided by feedlots to increase the value of 
manure.  With nutrient variation a main concern to crop producers, the study found that 
most feedlots exporting manure from the facility offered at least one service by 
conducting manure sampling, measurement of application rate, or adjustment in 
application rate for individual crop and field conditions.   
Ribaudo, Cattaneo, and Agapoff note that high transportation and handling costs 
relative to commercial fertilizer may discourage demand for manure.  Mentioned earlier 
as a positive attribute, organic matter in manure contributes to its bulkiness as a good and 
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requires greater volume to transport the same amount of nutrients relative to commercial 
fertilizer.  This leads to two other drawbacks.  Additional trips equate to increased soil 
compaction from spreading equipment and higher transportation costs.  Wortmann also 
cites that weed seed and foreign debris such as rock or concrete from feeding facilities 
can reduce the overall value of manure.   
Another characteristic about manure that can be considered both negative and 
positive is the nutrient release.  Unlike commercial fertilizer, manure is slower to release 
its nutrients.  A publication by Mitchell and Donald notes that about 70% of the total 
nitrogen in chicken litter will be available the first year.  This is because manure must 
endure a decomposition phase to mineralize the nitrogen into a usable form by plants.  
Likewise, phosphorus and potassium are considered about 75% as effective as 
commercial fertilizer in the first year.  For producers who have not had repeated 
applications of manure, this effectively reduces the value of the manure from 
approximately $35 a ton to around $25 a ton.  However, producers applying manure for 
several years, realize the residual value of unused manure nutrients from the previous 
season.  The slow release of nutrients also ensures a steady supply of nutrients throughout 
the growing season.  Granted, some crops such as corn require a very timely application 
of nutrients to ensure maximum yield.   
The method of application and the form of the manure also play a large role in 
creating manure value.  Manure is predominately applied topically to the soil, or it is 
incorporated (injected sub-surface).  There are several benefits to injecting manure.  The 
first is the reduction in the loss of nitrogen.  Mitchell and Donald note that applying 
broiler litter to the surface will result in a 5% to 20% loss of total nitrogen.  When 
 44
manure is spread in the form of a liquid or semi-liquid, as much as 25% of the total 
nitrogen can be lost to the atmosphere within seven days after spreading.  Nonetheless, 
incorporation is not practical for situations including pasture, hay fields, or planted crops.   
Another incentive to incorporate manure is to avoid complaints from neighbors 
and pest problems.  As the rural resident composition has changed, fewer residents are 
involved in agriculture and may perceive common application practices to be offensive 
and threatening to environmental amenities.  Glewen and Koelsch found that 60% of 
feedlots exporting manure have encountered some form of environmental or nuisance 
related concern.  The three most common were odors (28%), road traffic (26%), and road 
maintenance (24%).  For many crop producers, the chance of having an encounter with a 
neighbor about odor or pests may not be worth the savings in fertilizer costs.  To reduce 
this problem and others, some livestock facilities are composting manure.  Composting 
helps to reduce total moisture, which means less weight, reduces odor, and decreases 
weed seed germination.  However, Mitchell and Donald note that nitrogen loss is greater 
in composted manure and the nitrogen is less available to the crop because of the 
conversion from ammonia (usable form to plants) to organic (unusable in the short run).   
Among all these factors, Feinerman, Bosch, and Pease also cite that governmental 
regulations may influence a crop producer’s decision to seek manure.  As application 
restrictions become stricter for animal feeding operations, precise application rates must 
be recorded.  In some instances, crop producers must grant an easement to the livestock 
producer for liability stipulations outlined by the EPA.  Restrictions requiring manure to 
be applied based upon soil composition, slope of the soil, expected cropping activity, and 
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soil test levels all contribute to a more complicated process that decreases the value of 
manure (USDA, USEPA).   
Perhaps even more indicative of the manure demand components are studies 
conducted by Nunez and McCann and Wossink and Boonsaeng.  Wossink and 
Boonsaeng surveyed 66 North Carolina swine producers to access their knowledge and 
perceptions about waste management technologies.  Interesting in regard to our study is a 
question asking respondent’s opinions about what aspects of hog production need to be 
addressed to increase public acceptance of hog production facilities.  The study found the 
following factors were all considered significant in the minds of swine producers: 
ammonia emissions from farms, excess land application of phosphorus and nitrogen, 
ground and surface water contamination, transfer of pathogens in soil and manure, and 
farm odors.  Ground and surface water contamination were considered the two most 
important aspects that needed to be addressed.   
Nunez and McCann’s study was more specific in identifying factors that 
influenced a crop producer’s willingness-to-use livestock manure as fertilizer.  Their 
study identified perceived profitability, crop producer uncertainty, awareness of other 
farmers using manure, age, and location as significant factors influencing a producer’s 
willingness-to-use.  Across a sample of 775 respondents, producers were more likely to 
accept manure if they believed they could increase profits.  As well, decreasing 
uncertainty and increasing awareness of other surrounding producers using manure also 
increased willingness-to-accept manure.  Older producers were also less likely to use 
manure as a fertilizer source.  Finally, Nunez and McCann found that geographical 
location influenced willingness to accept manure.  The sample of both Missouri and Iowa 
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producers suggested that Iowa producers were more willing to accept application and 
suggests that cropping systems in Iowa are more conducive to accepting manure. 
In review, numerous factors have been identified in studies and literature that 
influence the demand for livestock and poultry manure as a substitute or supplemental 
fertilizer source.  To summarize these factors, a compiled list of factors influencing the 
demand for manure follows. 
1. Price of Manure 
2. Changes in Producer Income 
3. Changes in Price of Commercial Fertilizer 
4. Soil Composition 
5. Residual Nutrient Composition of Soil 
6. Crop Nutrient Requirements 
7. Manure Composition: Nutrient and Organic Material  
8. Uniformity of Manure across Applications 
9. Transportation Costs 
10. Soil Compaction 
11. Weed Seed and Foreign Material 
12. Rate of Nutrient Release 
13. Method of Application: Incorporation or Topical 
14. Odor and Pests: Increase Probability of Neighbor Encounters 
15. Manure Form: Liquid, Solid, or Slurry 
16. Federal Regulatory Requirements 
17. Profitability 
18. Contamination of Water Supplies 
19. Age of Producer 
20. Crop Producer Uncertainty about Manure Capabilities 
21. Knowledge of Surrounding Producers’ Experience 
22. Transfer of Pathogens to Soil 
23. Location of Crop Producer 
This extensive list, although not exhaustive, indicates it is unrealistic to attempt to 
measure all factors influencing crop producers’ willingness-to-pay for manure.  As a 
result, in the next chapter, variables deemed most important by the researcher are 
measured to estimate crop producers’ WTP.  One should note that when all explanatory 
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variables for a decision cannot be measured, one must focus on the marginal impact of 
explanatory variables for analysis.   
In the field of contingent valuation, fewer studies have utilized the method’s 
flexibility to represent decisions faced by agricultural producers concerning private goods 
such as this study does.  In viewing livestock manure as a recyclable, private good, this 
study considers a unique situation and extends into a far less researched area of 
contingent valuation.  The next chapter will demonstrate the survey methodology 
employed and summarize respondent data to provide insight into this study’s design and 
objectives. 
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Governmental regulations enacted by the Environmental Protection Agency in 
2003 are forcing many livestock producers to distribute the same amount of manure over 
a significantly larger land area.  These regulations create the potential for increased costs 
to be levied on livestock producers.  Two major components determining the cost of 
spreading manure is the distance it must be hauled and the number of localized crop 
producers willing to pay for manure.  To better identify the potential economic impacts of 
these regulations, this study determines components affecting crop producers’ 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for manure by administering a contingent valuation survey.  
(See Appendix I for the complete survey instrument.) 
This study’s objective is to identify the factors affecting a crop producers’ 
decision to purchase manure and the probability that a producer will pay a certain price.  
Therefore, the inverse demand for manure is modeled as: 
(1) WTP=f(Xi) 
where willingness-to-pay for manure, WTP, is a function of manure attributes and 
producer preferences, represented as Xi. 
Numerous valuation procedures have been used to determine the economic value 
of a good’s attributes by observing transactions.  Some of the most popular methods 
estimating value include regression analysis, benefit-cost analysis, and appraisal 
techniques.  Remember from the literature that these methods rely on data detailing 
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observable market transactions.  In the field of animal waste management, previous 
studies have attempted to place value on hypothetical transactions based on broad 
assumptions.  Unfortunately, these studies do not reveal manure attributes that create 
value for crop producers.  To obtain these data, a different methodology is required. 
Several reasons inhibit the ability to gather data and conduct an informative and 
conclusive study.  The first is that few market transactions occur between crop and 
livestock producers for manure, and furthermore, these exchanges poorly document the 
conditions surrounding an exchange.  Previous studies conducted by Feinerman, Bosch, 
and Pease and Glewen and Koelsch have done little to define demand components for 
crop producers.  In reviewing Glewen and Koelsch, results are limited to summary 
statistics that provide little indication of crop producers’ preference.  Feinerman, Bosch, 
and Pease determined value by assigning application, handling, and transportation costs 
to the manure nutrients.  Without consideration for other demand factors such as type of 
manure, moisture content, fertilizer needs, or market structure, the two studies reveal few 
characteristics about the real market value.   
This study seeks to obtain data that allows one to value manure based on manure 
attributes and the demographics of the manure buyer.  To satisfy these objectives, data 
must be collected detailing the circumstances surrounding a transaction.  Lacking a sound 
and observable market for data collection suggests designing a hypothetical market where 
crop producers indicate preference for a product.  Eliciting data by means of hypothetical 
questioning allows the surveyor to measure and control the manure attributes.  Recall the 
discussion in the previous chapter discussing non-market estimators.  Contingent 
valuation was defined as a method to ascertain the monetary value an individual places 
 50
upon a service or product through administration of a survey or questionnaire.  The 
survey respondent is presented with a hypothetical good described by its attributes and is 
asked to value the good.  This allows one to directly estimate value as a function of its 
attributes.  In the case of this study, a respondent is asked to value manure based on the 
attributes defined in the contingent valuation survey. 
 
Techniques for Eliciting Manure Value 
Survey Administration 
The contingent valuation survey was administered by Bailey Norwood, an 
assistant professor of the agricultural economics department at Oklahoma State 
University.  The survey was mailed to 512 Oklahoma crop producers in October of 2003.  
The sample population, attained from a university database, included the names of 
individuals actively involved in production agriculture.  These individuals had been 
previously identified by state and county extension agents as producers willing to 
participate in university research projects.  For these reasons, a high response rate was 
anticipated.  The survey generated 289 useful responses (56.4% response rate).   
A pretest survey was administered to self-proclaimed crop producers attending 
Oklahoma State University.  This helped determine the approximate time required to 
complete the survey, identify any confusing concepts, and verify the receptiveness of 
surveyed crop producers. 
The survey tool included 11 questions measuring demographic variables, 
respondent preferences, and crop producers’ WTP for manure given a specific set of 
product attributes.  The front page of the two-sheet booklet informed the individual of 
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federal regulations that will affect manure application practices.  Further, the survey 
informed the recipient of Oklahoma State University’s efforts to minimize the regulatory 
impact to Oklahoma farms. 
To obtain the most knowledgeable responses, the survey asked that the respondent 
be the individual “most responsible for farm management on (the) operation.”  This 
suggestion helped ensure survey respondents were most familiar with the concepts of 
fertilization and the challenging effects of regulations restricting the application of animal 
manure.  To further encourage participants’ response, the survey included a pre-paid 
postage envelope and attempted to stimulate the attitude of cultural preservation by 
characterizing a returned response as a philanthropic service to the “Oklahoma farm 
community.” 
 
Crop Producer Demographics 
Oklahoma, known for its oil wells, wheat, and cattle, is recognized across the 
nation as an agricultural state.  According to the Oklahoma Department of Agriculture’s 
website, Oklahoma is home to 85,000 farms and ranches that on average cover about 400 
acres.  Beef production in Oklahoma ranks fourth in the nation and contributes 
approximately $2 billion to the state’s cash receipts in agriculture.  As a major feedstock 
for the Oklahoma cattle industry, winter wheat production in Oklahoma ranks second 
nationally and is the state’s top cash crop, exceeding $500 million in agricultural sales.  
The Oklahoma swine industry has also risen to national prominence since state legislation 
in 1991 promoted the development of larger facilities. 
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One appealing aspect of conducting such a survey in the State of Oklahoma is the 
climatic differences between regions in the state and the diversity of both livestock 
production facilities and crop production practices.  To further explain, imagine 
Interstates 40 (east to west) and 35 (north to south) as regional boundaries dividing the 
state into four quadrants (Figure 4.).  Referring to statistics available from the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service, we can summarize the types of agricultural production 
observed in each region. 
 
Figure 4.  Interstate Regional Boundaries of Oklahoma 
Source: Oklahoma State University, Division of Agricultural Sciences and Natural Resources 
 
The northwest quadrant, including the panhandle, is predominately characterized 
by feeder and stocker cattle, large swine operations, and crop production, some of which 
is under center pivot irrigation.  Texas County, in the panhandle, is one of the most 
densely populated swine counties in the nation, and houses the largest swine facility and 
cattle feedlot in the state.  The northwest also produces the most significant portion of 
Oklahoma’s winter wheat.  This region is the only area that produces a significant 
amount of corn and silage corn, mainly due to the irrigation water available from the 
Ogallala aquifer.  Many producers in this area already practice effluent application on 
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their crops.  This situation provides an audience that we expect will be well informed 
about waste management issues, nutrient runoff, and the potentially damaging 
consequences from underground water contamination. 
The southwest’s arid climate is appropriate for cotton, peanuts, and winter wheat 
production.  The area includes a few beef cows, but is better suited for feeder cattle.  
Though similar to the northwest, farms in the southwest are generally smaller in scale.  
This region offers an audience that may be less familiar with waste management issues 
and the application of livestock manure to cropland. 
The northeastern quadrant possesses a wetter climate, and rougher terrain more 
conducive to beef cow-calf and poultry production.  Area crops include a small amount 
of corn and soybean production, but the land predominately lends itself to hay 
production.  This region has also been the center of many environmental questions due to 
the high concentration of poultry facilities, limited nutrient uptake by hay and pastures, 
shallow top soil, and the vast network of rivers, lakes, and streams that dissect the area 
and promote nutrient movement.  This quadrant of producers is expected to be adept to 
the environmental issues surrounding waste applications. 
The southeast is similar to the northeast in the respect that agricultural production 
in this area is largely poultry and beef cow-calf production.  Fewer swine facilities are 
found in the southeast in comparison to the northwest.  With respect to crops, the 
southeast is the wettest region in the state and is used predominately for hay and timber 
(forestry) production.  Figure 5 graphically identifies the number of survey respondents 
in each respective region. 
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Figure 5.  Regional Distribution of Survey Respondents 
 
The state provides a unique case study with an audience both familiar and 
unfamiliar to the issues of waste management.  Oklahoma includes a diverse set of crops, 
production facilities, climates, and terrain that vary significantly from the northwest to 
the southeast.  This survey anticipates a better understanding of crop producers’ 
knowledge in different regions and their preferences for manure as a fertilizer alternative.   
With a regional understanding of the state’s agricultural production practices, we 
now address the demographical section of the survey.  Creative Research Systems, a 
survey design consultant, suggests that the first questions in a survey should be simple to 
answer, encouraging participation throughout the survey.  Therefore, demographical 
questions followed the introductory section to acclimate respondents to the waste 
management topic.  Three questions appeared on the back of the first page, asking 
producers to indicate the crops managed, the number of acres under management, and 
any livestock managed. 
The first survey question prompted producers to mark any of the crops they 
managed.  This question identifies the distribution of crop management and helps ensure 
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a representative sample of the entire state.  The most commonly managed crop is pasture 
at more than 70% of the respondents.  In evaluating this statistic, note that the survey’s 
interpretation of “crop producer” includes all individuals who manage both forages and 
grain crops.  Thus, improved and native grass pasture managers are considered “crop 
producers” in the context of this study.  In identifying this group of producers, we 
acknowledge that the difference between improved and native grass pasture was not 
established.  Therefore, we must assume that this category includes both types. 
Several other categories registered high percentages of management, including 
winter wheat and hay production.  Table 1 lists the crops available for selection in the 
survey and the percentage of responding producers managing the crop.   
Table 1.  Percent of Respondents Managing Crop Types 
Crop Percent of Total 
Winter wheat for grain 48.8% 
Winter wheat for grazing 61.6% 
Winter wheat for grain and grazing 56.1% 
Corn for grain  8.3% 
Corn for silage 2.1% 
Grain sorghum 16.3% 
Soybeans 15.9% 
Alfalfa hay 30.8% 
Other hay 59.2% 
Pasture 72.0% 
Cotton 4.1% 
Oats 6.2% 
Barley 1.4% 
Rye 10.4% 
Peanuts 3.1% 
Other 6.6% 
Note: Producers were allowed to mark more than one category. 
 
Measuring the number of acres managed is another indicator ensuring a 
representative sample.  Determining the land available for spreading is important to 
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assess overall market potential and regional analysis.  Thus, the next question asks crop 
producers to indicate the number of crop and pasture acres they currently manage.  In this 
survey, a bimodal distribution was observed with the two largest percentages in the 
categories of 0 to 499 acres and 1,000 to 2,999 acres.  Comparatively, National 
Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) data of farm numbers from the 2002 Census of 
Agriculture indicates slightly different estimates.  Referring to Figure 6, observe the 
much larger percentage of farms distributed in the smaller acreage categories than this 
survey depicts in Figure 7.  NASS statistics indicate that 82% of Oklahoma’s farms are 
less than 500 acres.  Conversely, this category of survey respondents makes up only 
28.2% of surveyed farms.  Likewise, NASS finds that 9.2% of Oklahoma farms fall in the 
500 to 999 acre category where this sample indicates 19.2%.  The average size of NASS 
farms is 403.5 acres.  Surveyed respondents’ average farm size is 2,174.0 acres.  
Weighted averages are determined using the midpoint for each category and the upper 
bound categories are assigned a value of 3,500 acres and 12,000 acres, respectively. 
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Figure 6.  Acre Size of Oklahoma NASS Farms  
 Source: NASS Quick Stats 
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Figure 7.  Acre Size of Surveyed Oklahoma Farms  
 
A couple of factors can explain this anomaly between the data.  The United States 
Department of Agriculture identifies a farm as an operation with at least $1,000 of 
agricultural sales in a fiscal year.  Although these small farms comprise a significant 
portion of American agriculture, recall the scope of our survey is to determine a market 
outlet for large quantities of livestock manure.  Consider that it takes less than 30 acres of 
wheat with a yield of 30 bushels per acre and a price of $3 per bushel to exceed $2,500 in 
agricultural sales.  Nearly 36% of Oklahoma farms fall below $2,500 in sales (2002 
Census of Agriculture).  Therefore, many farms meet the qualifications of a farm by the 
USDA definition, but offer a very small outlet for livestock manure.  Hence, our survey 
relies on producers controlling a larger portion of land, making the decision to apply 
manure as fertilizer a more economically feasible alternative. 
For many producers in Oklahoma, operations are not exclusive to only crop or 
livestock production.  Few livestock production operations operate without land.  
Because many Oklahoma producers manage both crops and livestock, the third question 
sought to identify the number of producers that managed livestock along with their crops.  
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Gathering this information aids the researcher in identifying any potential correlation 
between willingness of a crop producer to accept or pay for manure and personal 
experience in managing livestock.  The question asked producers to check any of the 
listed livestock that they managed.  Over 80% of the respondents indicated that they 
managed cow-calf operations in addition to crops.  Of the 289 usable survey responses, 
only 17 did not indicate some type of livestock management (5.88%).  Yet, the only other 
livestock category that included more than 8% of the respondents was stockers at 54.3%.   
Observing large numbers of cattle and few other types of livestock is typical of 
Oklahoma.  As mentioned earlier, Oklahoma’s winter wheat is a vital feedstuff for 
stocker and cow-calf operations.  This combination works symbiotically by aiding in 
dispersing cash flows for producers throughout the year.  Likewise, labor intensity for 
one operation occurs during the down season of the other operation, and wheat can 
produce hay for the next year’s winter forage supply.  The complete table detailing 
livestock managed follows in Table 2. 
Table 2.  Percent of Respondents Managing Livestock Types 
Livestock Managed Percent of Total 
Cow/calf 80.6% 
Stockers 54.3% 
Cattle on Feed 6.9% 
Dairy cattle 1.7% 
Broilers 0.0% 
Other poultry 0.7% 
Swine 2.4% 
Sheep 3.4% 
Other 3.4% 
Note: Producers were allowed to mark more than one category. 
Yearly income is one of the most commonly asked questions in surveys due to its 
universal scope.  Income variables clarify whether a representative sample has been 
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obtained because everyone has income and it directly indicates an individuals’ 
purchasing power.  Therefore, the survey gathered respondents’ household yearly income 
before taxes.  As suggested by survey professionals, the income question was reserved 
for the end of the survey due to respondent sensitivity.  To develop rapport and elicit 
honest responses, the survey reassured the respondent that her response would be “held 
strictly confidential.”  Primarily, this variable allows the researcher to observe correlation 
between Oklahoma producers’ WTP for manure and their income.  For example, some 
producers may be willing to pay more for manure because their income security allows 
the producer to “experiment” with the potential enhancing effects of manure.  Some 
producers may view it as an entrepreneurial or innovative activity, while others view 
accepting manure as a detriment to the crop’s potential productivity.  The survey question 
follows in Figure 8, as it appeared in the survey. 
As close as you can recall, please estimate your household's yearly income before 
taxes by checking the appropriate box.  This question is used to ensure our sample 
is representative of all Oklahoma producers.  Please remember that your 
responses will be held strictly confidential. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Annual Household Income Question 
 
The average respondent’s income is $68,870.  3.8% of respondents did not answer 
the question.  Rather than consider these producers’ incomes to be $0 and bias the 
household income estimate, only surveys whose respondents indicated an income range 
are considered in determining the average.  In calculating the average, midpoints of the 
categories were assigned to incomes within the respective categories.  As for the upper 
and lower bound categories, a value of $17,000 and $120,000 was assigned respectively.  
Because of the large number of respondents who indicated an income above $79,999, the 
less than 
$20,000  
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researcher believes $120,000 represents all respondents in this category.  Figure 9 
represents the distribution of crop producer income. 
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Figure 9.  Annual Household Income 
 
In this survey, household income is measured instead of farming income because 
it more accurately represents the purchasing power of a respondent.  Income streams for 
agricultural families have changed over the last 25 years, and the majority of a family’s 
income involved in agriculture no longer comes from farming.  The Economic Research 
Service published in 2004 that off-farm wages and salaries actually totaled 55% of total 
farm household income.  As a result, household income should better indicate the 
financial stability of the farm.  In consulting the Economic Research Service report, the 
farm household income for 2003 was $68,483.  This estimate closely resembles the 
survey estimate and suggests a representative sample of Oklahoma producers has been 
obtained.  The next section discusses the numerous producer preference questions 
surrounding the contingent valuation question.   
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Crop Producer Experience and Preferences 
Preceding the contingent valuation question, measuring producers’ WTP, are 
three questions that clearly address the topic of the survey.  The questions concern 
previous manure experience, preference for manure type, and application preference of 
the product.  Demand theory states that product demand is a function of tastes and 
preferences, related product prices, product expectations, income, and population 
(Cramer, Jensen, and Southgate).  Identifying these characteristics and measuring 
producers’ WTP should help identify an inverse demand function for livestock waste.  
Thus, the remainder of the chapter seeks to obtain these indicators of demand. 
The fourth question appears on the survey’s second page and reads as follows.   
Has livestock manure been applied to any crop or pasture acres you managed in 
the last ten years? 
 
The producer then has two potential responses: “Yes” or “No.”  Only 24.6% of producers 
indicate that manure has been spread on any acres they managed.  This question designed 
to measure an individual’s experience with manure, helps identify correlation between 
previous manure application and a crop producer’s WTP for manure.  Other studies 
reveal that previous experience or product knowledge significantly increases the adoption 
rates of technology.  Koundouri, Nauges and Tzouvelekas, discussing technology 
adoption in irrigation, state that uncertainty associated with the adoption of any 
agricultural technology has two features: (1) the perceived risk of future farm yields after 
adoption, and (2) production or price uncertainty related with farming itself.  Moreover, a 
study compiled by Nunez and McCann finds that decreasing uncertainty and increasing 
awareness of other producers using manure increases the probability of using manure.  
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Therefore, one is led to believe that previous experience with manure impacts a 
producer’s decision to adopt manure as a substitute for fertilizer. 
Following the experience question, the survey introduces more complex and 
detail specific questions.  These decisions are designed to emulate decisions encountered 
in a real market transaction.  The next question seeks to determine whether manure form 
significantly influences a producer’s decision to purchase.  The question appears as 
follows.   
Livestock manure can be applied as solid manure or liquid manure.  Assuming the 
costs to you were the same, if you allowed livestock manure application to crop 
acres under your management, which manure form would you prefer?   
 
Respondents indicate that 55.0% do not prefer a manure form.  However, of those 
who do indicate a preference, 60.5% prefer solid form to liquid.  Though the reasons for 
this preference are not clear, it may rely on the perception that dry manure is less 
odorous, easier to handle, and contains less water resulting in a more accurate nutrient 
content. 
The next question measures a producer’s preference for surface or subsurface 
application.  Knowing that soil incorporation (subsurface) is more inclusive and 
expensive, the survey tests if a majority of crop producers prefer incorporation, 
something that could potentially increase the cost of application to livestock producers.  
Although this variable is a part of the contingent valuation question, an effort to measure 
this variable separate of other factors could specify whether the type of application is a 
major determinant in the willingness-to-pay decision. 
As expected, the survey finds that the majority of producers prefer incorporation.  
A couple of reasons support producers’ preference for manure incorporation.  The first is 
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to capture as many nutrients as possible.  By burying these nutrients in the soil, they are 
less likely to migrate from the application site following a rain.  This not only reduces the 
loss of nutrients to the atmosphere but also helps to control water pollution.  Soil 
microorganisms aid in the second benefit by accelerating the decomposition of complex 
nutrients found in manure.  For this reason, manure requires an extended period for 
nutrient release when compared to chemical fertilizer.   
In the survey, producers are asked to assume that application costs remain the 
same despite the type of application.  By holding cost constant, the survey can determine 
a producer’s true preference and more accurately predict her behavior during a real 
market transaction.  Below in Figure 10 is the question as it appeared in the text and a 
graphical representation of the survey responses.   
Livestock manure can be incorporated into the soil by either tilling the soil after 
surface application or through manure injection.  Assuming the costs to you were 
the same, if you allowed livestock manure applications to crop acres under your 
management, would you prefer soil incorporation? 
 
No
12.1%
Yes
45.9%
No Preference
38.3%
No Answer
3.8%
 
Figure 10.  Preference for Incorporation of Livestock Manure 
 
One concern is the percentage of individuals who did not respond to the question.  
It is somewhat difficult to determine why producers chose to not answer this question.  
 64
Speculation suggests that the complexity of the situation discourages producers from 
considering the possibilities.  Alternatively, producers may desire more information 
before feeling they can make a knowledgeable decision. 
The third page of the survey included another question measuring producer 
preferences.  This question follows the contingent valuation section because it helps 
prevent respondents from becoming complacent in answering questions of the same 
nature.  Question 10 asks crop producers that would allow manure application to identify 
any timing restrictions they would place on when livestock operators could spread 
manure.  Respondents choose between four responses, selecting the one best describing 
the crop producers’ timing preference for manure application.  The most common 
restriction, favored by 76.5% of respondents, is for applications to follow harvest and 
conclude prior to planting.  One explanation for application to occur over stubble or 
barren ground is that manure offers a greater chance than chemical fertilizer of covering 
or matting a crop and inhibiting the photosynthesis process.  Additionally, applying 
manure between crops allows producers, who prefer the manure to be incorporated, to 
immediately work the ground and reduce the loss of nutrients from nitrogen volatilization 
and runoff.  Only 10.7% of producers indicate a preference for manure application during 
the growing season, assuming application does not interfere with crop growth.  Another 
9.0% do not indicate any restrictions for when manure can be applied.  Alternatively, 
7.3% either do not answer the question or mark the “Other” selection.   
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Measuring Preference for Manure Attributes 
The contingent valuation question measuring a producer’s WTP for manure is the 
seventh question of the survey and appears on the third page of the survey booklet (See 
Appendix I).  Placing the most difficult and important question late in the survey 
achieves two purposes: (1) previous questions effectively inform the producer of 
potential decision factors to stimulate a calculated response and (2) the respondent is less 
likely to become discouraged and discontinue the survey due to question difficulty 
because of the time already invested.  This question is the primary reason for the survey, 
and it is carefully designed to minimize any bias and ensure all producers thoroughly 
understand the situation.  This section details efforts to minimize the phenomenon of 
hypothetical bias that require the meticulous design.  Meanwhile, other components of 
the contingent valuation question are emphasized. 
Assuming few producers apply manure to their land, the survey asks the 
respondents to suppose that their cropland has traditionally received only commercial 
fertilizer.  As verified earlier, more than 75% of responding producers have not received 
livestock manure in the past ten years.  Designing the question in this way allows three-
fourths of producers to simplify the hypothetical situation.  They can consider their own 
production operation and focus on only how price and manure attributes affect their 
decision.  
Within the question, five variables are randomly assigned to each survey.  The 
five manure attributes varied randomly across surveys include the type of manure, type of 
application, manure form, fertilizer savings per acre, and the price a producer is asked to 
pay for the manure.  For simplicity, only swine and poultry manure are considered in the 
 66
survey.  The reason for selecting these two manure types is that swine and poultry are the 
two livestock industries in Oklahoma that will be most affected by the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s CAFO Rule.  Because stockers and cow-calf operations typically 
avoid confined animal feeding operation regulations, waste management is less of a 
concern to the Oklahoma beef sector. 
The type of application varied in the contingent valuation question is manure 
incorporation or no incorporation.  Though this variable is measured individually, 
including this variable in the question allows the researcher to observe interaction 
between the other variables.  One may note that the survey does not specify whether 
incorporation will occur at the time of application or following application.  However, 
one can infer that an application of solid manure would require some type of soil tillage 
to complete incorporation.  Manure in the liquid state can be incorporated using a 
specialized applicator at the time of spreading without soil tillage. 
The form of manure is also varied in the survey.  Two forms are observed in the 
survey: liquid or solid.  Because chicken manure is naturally solid, it is presented in the 
solid form, without exception.  As for swine manure, form is observed as both solid and 
liquid.  Traditionally, Oklahoma swine operations utilize lagoons systems for storing 
waste.  As a result, the most common form of swine manure is liquid because water is 
used as a vehicle to wash facilities and transport manure to a holding facility.  However, 
technology is allowing some operations to separate manure from water.  This allows 
facilities to offer swine manure in the solid form and justifies the use of solid manure in 
the survey. 
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The savings per acre variable consists of two observable values: $10 or $20.  
Savings are considered the reductions in commercial fertilizer costs to the crop producer 
by substituting manure for commercial fertilizer.  The savings are determined in each 
survey using an equal probability (50%-50% chance) of observing either $10 or $20, 
specifying the savings in chemical fertilizer and helping a survey respondent to more 
easily comprehend the fiscal benefits of spreading manure.  This encourages the producer 
to recognize savings as a positive manure attribute and determine a personal value for the 
manure.  Assuming a fixed amount of savings also eliminates the need for the researcher 
to define the nutrient content of manure and the subsequent application rate.  Speculating 
that savings to crop producers is a large determinant in willingness-to-pay, a range of 
manure prices is associated with each savings value.   
Determining the price for manure is based on many considerations.  In 
rationalizing how to determine a crop producer’s WTP, the study assumes that all crop 
producers represent one of three categories.  For some producers, their willingness-to-pay 
exceeds $0, and they pay a positive price to have manure applied to their cropland.  For 
others, willingness-to-pay is equal to $0, indicating that the crop producer allows manure 
application, but is unwilling to pay for the product.  The final group’s willingness-to-pay 
value is less than $0.  In other words, individuals belonging to this group have to receive 
a per acre payment before accepting manure.   
The most important consideration for determining a price range is the savings.  
One can assume that few producers are willing to pay a price for manure that greatly 
exceeds their savings.  Therefore, the upper bound price a crop producer could be asked 
to pay is $5 greater than total savings.  For example, if a producer is assigned a savings of 
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$10 per acre in commercial fertilizer cost, the highest price any one survey can reveal is a 
price of $15 per acre.  Likewise, a lower bound value is established.  The lower bound 
value considers that many producers may refuse to have manure applied to their acres 
unless compensated.  Many producers associate manure with negative externalities 
(pathogen transmission, weed seed, soil compaction, foreign material such as rocks, etc.).  
As a result, some surveys ask crop producers if they would be willing to accept manure if 
the livestock producer paid $X per acre to spread manure on the cropland.  Adding this 
survey component allows the study to determine the number of crop producers requiring 
compensation prior to manure application on their cropland.  These survey prices are 
recorded as negative numbers, indicating a negative price observed by the livestock 
producer.  In summary, the range of prices that a survey realizes if the savings are 
determined to be $10 per acre is between $-10 and $15 per acre.  Likewise, surveys 
assigned a savings of $20 per acre have a price range between $-10 and $25 per acre.  
Survey prices are observed as integers and randomized using a uniform distribution.   
In terms of response, producers can mark “Yes,” “No,” or “No Answer.”  
Theoretically, if a producer marks “Yes” then one concludes that a crop producer would 
allow manure spreading, subject to the product attributes and price described in the 
survey.  Realize that some producers are asked if they would receive manure if paid a 
price.  Therefore, a “Yes” response characterizes both the producer that is willing to pay 
for manure as well as the producer that is being paid to accept the manure.  Similarly, a 
“No” response includes both producers who are not willing to pay $X per acre for 
manure and those who would not allow spreading despite being paid.  As suggested by 
Creative Research Systems, the third response, “No Answer,” is offered for producers 
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who cannot make a decision.  Creative Research Systems suggests that by offering 
“Don’t know” or “No Answer” responses, the survey administrator avoids frustrating 
respondents and making them feel they are being forced to respond without adequate 
information.  Further, research finds that once a respondent becomes frustrated, she is 
less likely to continue answering a survey.  Figure 11 presents the contingent valuation 
question as it appears in the survey. 
Suppose your crop has traditionally received commercial fertilizer but no 
livestock manure.  You now have the opportunity to let a nearby producer apply 
swine manure to your crop.  With the swine manure application, you would not 
need to apply commercial fertilizer and would save $20 per acre in commercial 
fertilizer costs.  The manure is of the liquid form and is incorporated into the 
soil.   
  
If the livestock producer offered to pay you $6 per acre to apply manure to your 
crop, would you accept the offer? 
  
 
Figure 11.  Contingent Valuation Question 
Note: Variables randomly varied between surveys are bolded in this figure to more easily observe 
placement and order. 
 
Sixty-three percent of surveyed individuals responding to the survey indicate that 
they would accept their offer detailed in the survey.  A skeptic may believe that only 
individuals paid to accept manure responded with “Yes.”  However, 74 of the 182 
affirmative respondents accept the offer despite being asked to pay $X per acre.  One 
caution in analyzing this data is the potential for hypothetical bias.  Though measures are 
taken to eliminate the problem in the estimation process, the above statistics are not 
corrected for hypothetical bias.  The following section will discuss methods implemented 
to reduce hypothetical bias and the potentially misleading conclusions. 
Yes No No Answer 
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Eighteen and six-tenths of respondents decline the hypothetical offer and another 
18.3% decline to answer the question.  A question immediately follows asking those 
individuals who checked “No Answer” to indicate from a list the response that best 
described their reason for not answering.  The list includes four responses.  The first is 
that a respondent cannot distinguish between “yes” or “no.”  The next response is that an 
individual does not have enough information to make the decision.  Thirdly, the 
individual indicates a preference for some other type of mechanism for making the 
decision, and the last response is “Other” in which the respondent is then prompted to 
explain. 
Of the 53 producers who mark “No Answer,” 49 proceed to indicate why they do 
not make a decision.  Nearly 90% of these producers said they need additional 
information to make the decision.  This high percentage unable to make a decision helps 
assure the researcher that biased data is being avoided.  In other words, it is unrealistic to 
assume that in a real market transaction the given information would be sufficient for all 
crop producers to make a decision. 
In addition to “No Answer” respondents, a number of individuals who select 
“No” on the contingent valuation question also proceed to answer this question.  Nearly 
49% indicate that they also choose “No” due to insufficient information.  34% indicate 
“Other” reasons.  This is promising for the livestock producer because it suggests that 
potentially an even larger market may exist for manure if crop producers are provided 
with additional information.  However, to maintain conservative estimates, speculation 
about the possibility of a market greater than what our survey data indicates will be 
considered no further. 
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Removing Hypothetical Bias 
As previously mentioned, hypothetical bias can significantly decrease the validity 
of research results.  This section details the methodological procedures employed by this 
survey to remove bias.  The first objective of the survey is to provide an introduction to 
the producers detailing the survey objectives, background information to help the 
producer understand the importance and need for the survey information, a form of 
contact, and the approximate time required to complete the survey.  Providing the 
respondent with this information not only develops rapport, but also helps to ensure that 
producers base decisions on information and not biased perceptions.  However, the two 
most important components in reducing hypothetical bias and providing conservative 
estimates include a cheap talk script and calibration mechanism. 
Recall that hypothetical bias occurs when subjects overestimate their true value of 
a good.  Champ and Bishop describe the source of bias as respondents who have positive 
feelings toward a project or good but do not purchase in a real market.  Realizing this has 
represented the Achilles heal of contingent valuation, several procedures are 
implemented in this study to avert the problem. 
Cheap talk is a concept that reminds respondents of their natural tendency to 
overestimate WTP in a hypothetical market situation.  Numerous studies reveal that 
stated willingness-to-pay values are significantly lower in surveys where cheap talk is 
used.  As will be observed, a brief cheap talk script precedes the contingent valuation 
question in effort to reduce crop producers’ WTP.  Below in Figure 12 is the cheap talk 
script as it appears in the survey.  As discussed in the literature review, Lusk and 
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Cummings and Taylor have significant findings to indicate cheap talk is effective at 
reducing hypothetical bias, especially when the audience is unfamiliar with the product.  
Though cheap talk is effective at reducing hypothetical bias, many argue that cheap talk 
does not entirely eliminate hypothetical bias.  Thus, a second strategy referred to as 
calibration is employed ex-post to the contingent valuation question. 
In the next question, we would like you to tell us how you feel about substituting 
livestock manure for commercial fertilizer.  Studies have found that people tend to 
overestimate their willingness to accept or pay money in hypothetical situations.  
When answering the question, please consider how you would react if you 
actually had to pay or accept real money that could be used for other goods and 
services. 
 
Figure 12.  Survey Cheap Talk Script 
 
Calibration is another form of bias reduction that attempts to measure how certain 
the individual is that her stated behavior would be the same in a true market setting.  In 
other words, how closely does her hypothetical behavior represent her true behavior?  In 
the case of this survey, a ten-point Likert scale is employed.  If a respondent replies with 
“Yes” to the contingent valuation question, she is then directed to circle a number from 
one to ten, (1 representing very uncertain and 10 representing very certain) to indicate 
how likely she would make the same decision if the transaction involved real money. 
Champ and Bishop reveal that using individuals’ certainty to recode responses is 
very effective at reducing hypothetical bias.  For example, if a crop producer responds 
that they accept manure and then choose a certainty level below the defined threshold, the 
response is recoded to “No” for statistical estimation. 
One problem experienced in calibration is the subjectivity of a certainty threshold.  
Numerous studies compare revealed preferences to stated preferences.  Though an 
absolute threshold value has not been determined to serve as a benchmark, research 
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indicates that employing a certainty level of eight eliminates hypothetical bias.  Previous 
studies find that a threshold of eight either will produce unbiased value estimates, or will 
underestimate true values.  Thus, the use of the certainty-calibration provides a 
conservative value estimate.  Using cheap talk and calibration can help to develop two 
data sets.  Calibrated data conservatively estimates WTP, whereas the uncalibrated data 
set likely overstates WTP.  Therefore, the use of calibrated and uncalibrated data sets 
should provide a lower and upper bound to the true willingness-to-pay values (Norwood).  
Take a moment to observe how this strategy has influenced our survey data.  Recall that 
before any calibration technique, 182 survey respondents said they would agree to the 
offer.  After calibrating uncertain “Yes” responses to “No” responses, we find that only 
119 respondents would theoretically exercise their specific survey scenario in a real 
market.  As you can see, this one tool reduces the percentage of surveyed individuals who 
indicate they would agree from 63.0% to 41.2%. 
 
Summary 
The intention of this study is to determine and assess the effects of the Clean 
Water Act regulations on Oklahoma livestock producers.  Because many livestock 
producers will have to export manure from their facilities to become regulation 
compliant, this study seeks to determine the size, scope, and characteristics of the manure 
market by collecting data about Oklahoma crop producers.  More specifically, a survey 
tool is designed to measure Oklahoma crop producers’ willingness-to-pay for livestock 
manure. 
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The survey pool of 512 crop producers generates 289 useful responses.  Of the 
crop producers surveyed, at least one out of every two respondents managed winter wheat 
for grazing, dual-purpose wheat (grain and grazing), pasture and other hay (non alfalfa).  
Farmers are involved with other crops such as corn, barley, rye, peanuts, soybeans, and 
cotton, but to a much smaller degree.  Because of Oklahoma’s strong beef cattle 
presence, 80.6% of the crop producers are also involved with cow-calf operations.   
The survey employs both cheap talk script and certainty calibration to reduce the 
problems associated with hypothetical bias in contingent valuation studies.  Absent 
calibration techniques, 63.0% of crop producers indicate that they would accept the 
survey offer and allow manure spreading.  With calibration, only 41.2% participate.  
Preliminary indications suggest that many livestock producers could export manure to 
neighboring crop producers given the commercial fertilizer savings indicated in the 
survey.  However, to this point, three-fourths of crop producers have not spread manure 
on any of their cropland in the last ten years.  Though the large majority of crop 
producers are inexperienced with manure, the study measures demographical and 
preferential characteristics to predict the likelihood that a crop producer will participate in 
a realistic market. 
The next chapter develops the random utility model and incorporates producer 
preferences and manure attributes into the model.  Following the theory of maximum 
likelihood, interpretation of the results informs the livestock producer about preferred 
manure attributes and the probability of crop producer acceptance. 
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CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Federal regulations could force livestock producers to seek off-farm acres on 
which to apply manure.  This research seeks to inform livestock producers about potential 
alternatives to reduce compliance costs.  Specifically, this study estimates Oklahoma crop 
producers’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for manure as a commercial fertilizer substitute.  
Using contingent valuation, the distribution of WTP across producers is estimated, as 
well as the impact of manure attributes and demographics on WTP. 
As previously discussed, one of the major problems determining the substitution 
value of livestock manure for commercial fertilizer is the absence of data detailing 
manure market transactions.  To estimate compliance costs for livestock producers, data 
are necessary that details the market value of manure.  In absence of market data, a 
hypothetical market is established to determine crop producers’ preferences for livestock 
manure and estimate crop producers’ willingness-to-pay. 
The chapter revisits the contingent valuation question design and modeling 
willingness-to-pay under random utility theory.  Next, the chapter includes the 
development of the maximum likelihood estimation procedure.  Finally, procedures 
allowing the researcher to provide information to livestock producers about favorable 
manure attributes are discussed. 
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Determination of Willingness-to-Pay 
Recall the contingent valuation question discussed in the preceding chapter 
identified the context of the question and specific manure attributes.  Remember that 
contingent valuation is widely used for its flexibility in eliciting data for estimation 
procedures and placing monetary value on goods and services not regularly bought and 
sold in the marketplace.  As a result, this modeling procedure allows the researcher to 
generate numerous scenarios where respondents indicate their preferences by responding 
to a dichotomous choice question.  Specifically, the respondent is presented with a 
hypothetical purchasing opportunity and is asked whether she would make the purchase. 
The purchasing opportunity described varies according to four dummy variables: 
fertilizer savings, manure incorporation, livestock type, and physical form of manure.  
Producers observe a savings of $10 or $20 per acre in commercial fertilizer costs; the 
manure is either incorporated or broadcast; the producer either receives swine or poultry 
manure; and the respondent observes manure of either liquid or dry form.  Following the 
described scenario, the survey asks the individual if she would be willing to pay the 
stated price.11  This price serves as the indicator for the producer’s actual willingness-to-
pay.  Suppose that a producer’s WTP is composed of two parts: one is an observable 
component (a function of four explanatory variables) and the other is random and 
unobserved.  Using this design, the researcher models producer i’s decision with the 
following utility function by substituting WTP for utility using a money-metric 
assignment:  
                                                 
11 The price observed by a respondent can be either negative or positive.  In the case of a positive price, the 
producer is asked to pay the stated amount to receive the manure.  A price is considered to be negative 
when the producer is asked to accept the manure for a payment (i.e. The livestock producer pays the crop 
producer to take the manure.). 
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(2) WTPi = Xiβ + εi 
where WTPi represents the true manure value, Xi is the vector of explanatory variables, β 
is a conformable vector of coefficients, and εi represents the unobserved WTP component 
for individual i.  The first component of the formula is the Xiβ matrix.  Because we 
observe an individual’s WTP as a function of individual manure attributes, Xiβ can be 
expressed as a linear combination of manure attributes.  Consider the following example: 
(3) Xiβ = β1 + β2[savingsi] + β3[liquidswinei] + β4[dryswinei] + β5[incorporationi], 
 
where savings represents a dummy variable where the variable takes the value of one for 
$20 in fertilizer savings and zero for savings of $10.  This implies that the intercept, β1, 
will represent the coefficient for $10 in fertilizer savings when all other explanatory 
variables are held constant in the equation.  The variables liquidswine and dryswine 
represent the dummy variables for liquid swine manure and solid swine manure with dry 
poultry manure serving as the reference group.  Dry poultry manure’s coefficient would 
then be observed within the intercept coefficient, ceteris paribus.  The last variable, 
incorporation, is a dummy variable assuming a value of one if the livestock producer 
incorporates the manure into the soil, and zero otherwise.   
The second term of WTP, iε , is assumed to be normally distributed and accounts 
for any random noise and explanatory variables not measured within the study.  In other 
words, this pricing component represents all other unnamed factors that affect a crop 
producer’s decision to purchase livestock manure.  Under these assumptions, WTP is 
linearly expressed in the following way. 
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(4)   WTPi = β1 + β2[savingsi] + β3[liquidswinei] + β4[dryswinei] + β5[incorporationi] + εi 
We can now introduce the theoretical framework of maximum likelihood to 
obtain coefficient estimates.  Intuitively, a crop producers’ decision to purchase occurs 
when her utility from the product exceeds the cost provided in her survey.  In other 
words, a producer decides to purchase manure when her willingness-to-pay exceeds the 
price, Pi.  Recall that a producer’s response is observed by means of a dichotomous 
choice question.  Therefore, a producers’ WTP is made evident through the discrete 
indicator variable, Ii, such that  
(5) Ii = 1 if WTPi > Pi, 
    = 0 otherwise. 
Assuming the error term is normally distributed, the following statement is made about 
the probability of observing a “Yes” response.  
(6) Pr(Ii = 1) = Pr(WTPi > Pi) 
 = Pr(Xiβ + εi  > Pi) 
 = Pr(εi  > Pi - Xiβ) 
The probability of observing a “Yes” response is expressed where unexplained variation, 
εi, is greater than the crop producer’s observed price, Pi, less the Xiβ term.  Likewise, a 
“No” response, where Ii = 0, is represented by Equation 7. 
(7) Pr(Ii = 0) = Pr(εi  < Pi - Xiβ) 
If the researcher allows Φ(x) to denote the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function of all survey responses, then, Equations 6 and 7 are written as 
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where σ represents the standard error of εi. 
Implementing these two equations allows the researcher to construct a maximum 
likelihood estimator.  This estimation procedure will determine the β matrix and variance 
of the εi.  The probability of observing the ith survey response, given β and σ , is 
(10) ( ) ii IiiIii PP −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −ΧΦ−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −ΧΦ=
1
iiik 1P ,I ,X  σ ,βL σ
β
σ
β
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for the entire sample.  Equation 11 is referred to as a log-likelihood function.  One should 
also note the following characteristics of maximum likelihood estimators.  Estimates are 
consistent, asymptotically normal, efficient, and progress toward a normal distribution 
centered around the true parameter value in large sample sizes (Maximum Likelihood 
Procedures).   
 
Coefficient Interpretation 
In regard to this type of willingness-to-pay model, Cameron and Quiggin explain 
that willingness-to-pay models predict the probability an individual is willing to pay a 
specific price for a product.  Each survey assigns an arbitrary price to be interpreted as a 
threshold value.  Measuring this variable across a large number of surveys allows the 
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researcher to use the price as an explanatory variable.  The researcher uses the producer’s 
response to the question and associates the threshold value with producer characteristics, 
manure attributes, and answers from similar respondents.  This allows the researcher to 
employ a likelihood estimation procedure and estimate the average WTP for the entire 
population under certain circumstances and producer characteristics.  Though the model 
does not allow the researcher to determine the exact threshold for each individual, all 
observations combined allow an average WTP to be established.  Computing this value is 
similar to a weighted average such that, Σpiti where pi is the probability that respondent i 
will pay the threshold price ti.  One advantage this approach offers is that the greater the 
number of explanatory variables gathered in the study and the greater the number of 
respondents, the more accurate the researcher can estimate the true WTP value for the 
population.   
After the β coefficients are estimated, one can predict the percentage of producers 
likely to accept manure application at any price level.  To accomplish this task, 
coefficients are inserted into Equation 4 to estimate the average price that crop producers 
are willing to pay for manure under a specific set of attributes.   
Intuitively, model estimates allow the researcher to make the interpretations about 
crop producers’ WTP.  For example, assume that 50% of the respondents who were asked 
to pay $5 per acre for manure replied “Yes” and the other 50% replied “No.”  Therefore, 
on average, the WTP is equal to $5 per acre.  Similarly, if more than 50% respond “Yes,” 
then the average WTP is greater than $5 per acre.  The same can be said for negative 
responses.  If “No” responses exceed 50%, then WTP for manure is less than $5 per acre.   
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The researcher can also analyze each attribute individually to determine how the 
specific attribute affects the manure price.  For example, if we assume that only manure 
form is varied and all other explanatory variables are held constant, then the premium for 
solid manure over liquid manure can be determined, provided crop producers’ WTP.  
Assume that the average respondent’s WTP for liquid manure is $4 per acre in 
comparison to $6 per acre for dry manure.  Hence, the researcher concludes that the 
average crop producer is willing to pay a $2 premium to have dry manure over liquid 
manure.  This rational can be applied to the interpretation of all variables.  However, one 
must realize that this interpretation restricts an individual to analyzing only one variable 
at a time while all others variables are held constant.   
This study uses a number of dummy variables to determine the correlation 
between willingness-to-pay and specific manure attributes.  Let us take a moment to 
explain the interpretation of coefficients for dummy variables.  After the willingness-to-
pay coefficients are estimated, the researcher can estimate the price at which a producer 
would have the highest probability of paying.  Hill, Griffiths, and Judge note that 
intercept dummy variables are additive.  In other words, the quantitative value observed 
for a variable omitted from the estimation as part of the reference group is added to the 
regression intercept.  Consider Equation 4 in the previous section.  If savings are assumed 
to be $10 per acre, then β2 is equal to zero and the quantitative value for $10 in savings is 
observed in the regression intercept.  Figure 13 provides the willingness-to-pay equation 
with described manure attributes.  Notice that the researcher progressively describes a 
situation in which the beta coefficients are equal to zero and the qualitative value for the 
attribute is observed by the intercept coefficient. 
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Figure 13.  Estimated Willingness-to-Pay for Alternative Manure Attributes 
The next chapter expands on the discussed theoretical concepts and provides 
insight to producers and policymakers about crop producer preferences and marketing 
alternatives through analysis of the results.  Beta and variance estimates are analyzed to 
determine the marginal effects of demographical and experience variables on crop 
producers’ willingness-to-pay.  The chapter concludes with a cumulative distribution 
function estimating the percentage of producers who would purchase manure at a given 
price. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The cost for livestock producers to comply with governmental regulations 
depends on the ability to export manure to off-farm acres.  By selling manure for a 
positive price to a large majority of crop producers, livestock producers can buffer 
themselves from the cost of compliance.  This chapter uses the data discussed previously 
to estimate the value of manure as perceived by crop producers.  The following results 
are generated from 289 survey responses obtained from Oklahoma crop producers.   
The primary objective of this study is to help researchers better estimate 
compliance costs to animal feeding operations under governmental regulations by 
observing the factors affecting a crop producers’ decision to purchase manure.  To 
accomplish this task, the researcher considers factors such as regional dispersion, income, 
farm size, and management practices.  Collectively, the research results contribute to the 
academic knowledge by helping determine if a viable market exists for manure to provide 
offsetting cash flow to compliance costs.   
The results in this chapter are obtained by employing an unconstrained 
optimization algorithm in MATLAB to minimize the log-likelihood formula, Equation 
11, in the previous chapter.  With the use of contingent valuation under a random utility 
framework, the researcher measures the influence of several factors on crop producers’ 
willingness to use livestock manure as a commercial fertilizer substitute.  In the following 
sections, several models are used to identify specific purchasing behaviors.  A brief 
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chapter outline includes identifying the variables measured and discussing organization 
of the agricultural industry, briefly revisiting the estimation tool and hypothetical bias 
reduction techniques, discussing models and hypothesis test significance, and developing 
a cumulative distribution of willingness-to-pay. 
 
Data and Estimation 
Estimating the willingness-to-pay of crop producers is the major purpose of this 
study.  Numerous survey tools are involved to ensure that the results are representative of 
crop producers’ true willingness-to-pay (WTP).  In doing this, clarifying the steps and 
data used in the estimation process is imperative to inform the reader of this study’s 
procedures.  Let us briefly revisit the information collected from survey respondents.  
Demographically, the survey mechanism reveals information about the Oklahoma 
farming situation and producer practices.  The researcher discovers many facts about crop 
producers to potentially explain deviations in WTP.  In surveying the crop producers of 
Oklahoma, more than 94% of the crop producers also managed livestock under 
diversified operations.  This characteristic is somewhat unique with respect to other 
agricultural states in that Oklahoma is comprised of starkly different land and soil types.  
Different from Midwestern states primarily assigned to crop production and Western 
grazing states, Oklahoma’s different soil types promote diversified livestock and crop 
operations.   
Recall that the survey’s main question focuses on identifying a willingness-to-pay 
value for the average crop producer based on manure attributes.  Before analyzing the 
models, it is important to clarify the variables and any manipulation performed on the 
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original data set.  Table 3 highlights the variables used in the estimation procedures and 
the respective survey question prompting the information.   
A couple of tools are being implemented to correct hypothetical bias.  One 
method employs a certainty calibration technique that produces two individual data sets; 
one calibrated and the other uncalibrated.  Both of these data sets are also under the 
influence of a cheap talk mechanism administered during the survey.  Individually, these 
tools have been demonstrated in numerous studies (Lusk, Champ and Bishop, Cummings 
and Taylor, and Cameron and Quiggin) to produce relatively unbiased estimates of true 
values.  In fact, these mechanisms provide two biased data sets, creating a lower and 
upper bound of the true values as suggested by Norwood.  The calibrated data with cheap 
talk influence likely biases the results in the direction of underestimating a crop 
producer’s WTP.  The uncalibrated data set likely produces a biased set in the direction 
of overestimating crop producers’ WTP.   
Another remark about the data are the exclusion of observations.  Within some 
surveys, producers chose to not answer specific questions.  For instance, several chose 
not to identify an income range.  Because one cannot predict the income of these 
individuals, this requires the observations to be omitted from the data set to prevent any 
bias.  In these instances, the sample size will be less than 289. 
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Table 3.  Survey Variables 
Survey Question Variable Name Description 
Has livestock manure been applied to any 
crop or pasture acres you managed in the 
last ten years 
Experience 1 if “Yes”, 0 otherwise 
  
How many crop or pasture acres do you 
currently manage (Data are scaled 
according to maximum category) 
Acres 0.2 if 0-499 acres 
0.4 if 500-999 acres 
0.6 if 1,000-2,999acres 
0.8 if 3,000-9,999 acres 
1.0 if 10,000+ acres 
  
Contingent Valuation Question: Variables 
randomly predetermined for survey 
respondent 
Savings 1 if savings is $20 per acre 
of commercial fertilizer, 0 if 
savings is $10 per acre 
 Incorporation 1 if manure is incorporated, 
0 if not incorporated 
 Drypoultry 1 if manure is solid and 
poultry, 0 otherwise 
 Dryswine 1 if manure is solid and 
swine, 0 otherwise 
 Liquidswine 1 if manure is liquid and 
swine, 0 otherwise 
  
Price producer is asked to pay in survey P -10, -9, -8, …23, 24, 25 
  
Estimate your household’s yearly income 
before taxes (Data are scaled according to 
maximum category) 
Income 0.2 if less than $20,000 
0.4 if $20,000-$39,999 
0.6 if $40,000-$59,999 
0.8 if $60,000-$79,999 
1.0 if $80,000+ 
  
Regional location determined by 
respondents’ mailing address 
Southeast 1 if south of I-40 and east of 
I-35, 0 otherwise 
 Southwest 1 if south of I-40 and west 
of I-35, 0 otherwise 
 Northwest 1 if north of I-40 and west 
of I-35, 0 otherwise 
 Northeast 1 if north of I-40 and east of 
I-35, 0 otherwise 
Note: Chapter 3 includes an in-depth discussion of the survey and all variables obtained. 
 
Before beginning the modeling process, we should clarify the information that 
coefficient estimates produce and how they are interpreted.  Observe that many variables 
in Table 3 are dummy variables.  These variables allow a researcher to express qualitative 
characteristics of the respondents in binary form.  Therefore, dummy variables require an 
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altered interpretation of the coefficients relative to other explanatory variables (Hill, 
Griffiths, and Judge).  Collectively, all estimates reveal two things about a variable.  First 
is the sign of the coefficient; this suggests whether an attribute negatively affects a crop 
producers’ WTP or if it positively affects WTP.  Secondly, the magnitude of a coefficient 
indicates how significantly the variable affects WTP.  Where interpretation differs for 
dummy variables is the signs and magnitudes are relative to variables contained within 
the reference group.  As discussed in the previous chapter, if all dummy variables for a 
category are included in the estimation of the model, perfect collinearity occurs.  To 
alleviate this problem, a dummy variable for a single category is omitted, which then 
defines a reference group.  As it is so called, the estimated coefficients then represent 
differences relative to this group.   
Consider the three types of manure observed in the survey: dryswine, liquidswine, 
and drypoultry.  Because these three variables are exhaustive in representing each type of 
manure in the survey, if all were included in the model estimation, the manure variables 
would be an exact linear combination of the intercept variable, x1 = 1.  This would lead to 
a misspecified model. By omitting drypoultry, the coefficients of liquidswine and 
dryswine are relative to drypoultry that is now part of the reference group.  In the case of 
all dummy variables in this study, they will be intercept dummy variables.  This implies 
the parallel shift of the function is a result of including drypoultry in the reference group 
and captures the effect on a crop producer’s WTP.  One must also recognize that intercept 
dummy variables are additive.  As more variables become a part of the reference group, 
parallel shifts of the intercept will take place to adjust for the respective variable's effect 
on WTP (Hill, Griffiths, and Judge). 
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In the case of insignificant variables, realize that two interpretations will take 
place.  For dummy variables, insignificance (not statistically different from zero) 
suggests that the variable is not found to differ from the relative variable that is part of 
the reference group.  For ordinary explanatory variables, insignificance suggests that the 
variable does not affect the average crop producer’s WTP. 
 
Savings Model 
The first simple linear model estimates crop producers’ willingness-to-pay using a 
modified probit model.  The model is composed of only two variables, the intercept and 
the dummy savings variable, and yields the following model 
(12) WTP = β1 + β2[savings] + ε 
with fertilizer savings of $10 (savings10) serving as the reference group for the model. 
We first observe in Table 4 that only the intercept of the uncalibrated model is 
significantly different from zero, based on the Wald test statistic.  The insignificance of 
the savings coefficient implies that in both the calibrated and uncalibrated models, 
producers are not willing to pay any greater price to receive manure that saves them $20 
in commercial fertilizer cost as compared to $10 in savings.   
The uncalibrated model estimates WTP to be about $10.  In contrast, the 
calibrated model implies that WTP does not significantly differ from zero.  Using these 
two models to define the bounds of WTP indicates the average crop producer’s WTP is in 
the range of $0 to $10.  Studies such as Glewen and Koelsch and Metcalfe et al. seem to 
support the conclusion that WTP is somewhere between $0 and a slightly positive value.  
However, the researcher feels that including additional explanatory variables may 
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generate greater evidence for a positive WTP of crop producers.  The next model 
introduces variables observed by producers in the survey’s contingent valuation question. 
Table 4.  Savings Influence on Willingness-to-Pay 
 Uncalibrated Model Calibrated Model 
 Parameter Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept       9.7613*** 
(3.6691) 
-2.3107 
(-1.0830) 
Savings 0.6637 
(0.1983) 
-0.6011 
(-0.1954) 
Standard Deviation of 
Error Term 
      21.3646*** 
(5.3824) 
      19.7111*** 
(5.5526) 
*, **, *** Indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance. 
Log Likelihood Function Value: -175.0990 (Uncalibrated) and -178.7599 (Calibrated) 
Sample size is 289. 
 
Baseline Model 
In Table 5, the researcher estimates four models accounting for manure 
characteristics.  Uncalibrated and Calibrated Models – 1 include only variables observed 
in the contingent valuation question.  These four variables are hypothesized to have the 
greatest influence on average WTP.  Therefore, expectation for the model estimates is 
that they will share a much greater correlation with WTP and provide greater insight into 
the behavioral decisions of a crop producer.  The model coefficients are obtained by 
estimating the following equation, 
(13)   WTP = β1 + β2[savings] + β3[incorporation] + β4[dryswine] + β5[liquidswine] + ε. 
Note that the reference group for this model is savings10, noincorporation, and 
drypoultry. 
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Table 5.  Contingent Valuation Question Estimates 
 Uncalibrated 
Model - 1 
Calibrated 
Model - 1 
Uncalibrated 
Model - 2 
Calibrated 
Model - 2 
 Parameter Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept       10.8016*** 
(2.8215) 
1.2307 
(0.4427) 
      9.9270*** 
(2.5644) 
-0.2494 
(-0.0751) 
Savings 0.7126 
(0.2142) 
-0.7114 
(-0.2650) 
1.0049 
(0.2999) 
-0.3850 
(-0.1502) 
Incorporation 0.4107 
(0.1189) 
-2.4123 
(-1.2038) 
0.5924 
(0.3473) 
-2.0783 
(-0.7475) 
Experience   3.4131 
(0.8388) 
5.1315 
(1.3915) 
Dryswine 0.0582 
(0.0139) 
-2.5637 
(-0.7362) 
0.0087 
(0.0022) 
-2.8254 
(-0.7266) 
Liquidswine -3.7888 
(-0.9463) 
-4.6945 
(-1.2700) 
-3.9748 
(-0.9873) 
-5.0230 
(-1.3988) 
Standard Dev. 
of Error Term 
      21.2477*** 
(5.4127) 
      19.5215*** 
(5.5337) 
      21.4750*** 
(5.5822) 
    19.8125*** 
(5.9219) 
*, **, *** Indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance. 
Log Likelihood Function Value: -174.4669 (Uncalibrated 1) & -177.6304 (Calibrated 1) 
Log Likelihood Function Value: -174.1003 (Uncalibrated 2) & -176.5869 (Calibrated 2) 
Sample size is 289. 
The second set of models adds a dummy variable for experience12.  Studies 
conducted by Nunez and McCann and Koundouri, Nauges, and Tzouvelekas confirm that 
experience is a key determinant in purchasing a new good.  Because of the renewed 
practice using manure as fertilizer, one expects experience to significantly influence 
WTP.  The reference group for the model will remain the same as Equation 13, but will 
add noexperience to the group.  The following equation represents the Calibrated and 
Uncalibrated models – 2. 
(14)   WTP = β1 + β2[savings] + β3[incorporation] + β4[experience] + β5[dryswine]  
 + β6[liquidswine ] + ε. 
 
The WTP models find that only the intercepts of the uncalibrated models are 
statistically significant.  Again, savings is not shown to increase a crop producers’ WTP.  
                                                 
12 For explanation of this variable and others, refer to Table 3 at the beginning of this chapter. 
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Likewise, incorporating manure is not valued any more than topically applying manure.  
Initially, this seems to contradict the results of Question 6 in the survey (See Appendix I).  
The question asks respondents outside the context of contingent valuation about their 
preference for manure incorporation.  46.0% do prefer incorporation in comparison with 
only 12.1% that do not.  The difference however is made up in the 38.4% who do not 
have a preference.  Observing the large percentage of producers with no preference may 
suggest why incorporation does not appear to influence the average crop producers' WTP.  
One must also consider that incorporation is specific to the crop being fertilized.  For 
crops such as pasture and planted grains, incorporation would not be preferred.   
The next group of variables in the model is type of manure.  Three types of 
manure are defined in the surveys: solid swine manure, liquid swine manure, or solid 
poultry manure.  Manure type estimates across all four models indicate that no variable is 
different from zero.  In other words, crop producers’ WTP is not affected by the type of 
livestock manure or the form offered.  One explanation for this behavior is that manure 
form may actually be specific to the type of crops or stage of crop growth at the time of 
manure application.  For some producers, solid may be better for those desiring no 
incorporation and a slower nutrient release.  However, if producers desire an application 
to a maturing corn crop, solid manure may result in matting and crop loss.  Therefore, a 
premium may not exist for different manure forms, because preferred form is relative to 
the producers’ given production situation.   
Because Calibrated and Uncalibrated Models – 1 do not generate significant 
results, experience is added as an explanatory variable as it is hypothesized to increase a 
crop producer’s WTP.  Estimates in Table 4 indicate, however, that the variable is not 
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significant in either the calibrated or uncalibrated models.  Often, Wald test statistics are 
not the most accurate depiction of significance for variables estimated under a likelihood 
estimation procedure.  Statistics offers many other approaches to test for coefficient 
significance on WTP, and one of those is the likelihood ratio test.  Employing a 
likelihood ratio (LR) test on Calibrated Model – 2 allows the study to determine if 
experience affects WTP (HO: β4=0 vs. HA: β4≠0).  Maddala indicates that a likelihood 
ratio test is defined as –2logeλ and is distributed as a Chi-square with k degrees of 
freedom; where k is defined as the number of parameters being restricted and λ represents 
the maximum likelihood coefficient of the restricted model, RLˆ , divided by the maximum 
likelihood coefficient of the unrestricted model, ULˆ .  Rearranging terms, the test is 
expressed as 
(15) 2~)]ˆln()ˆ[ln(2LR kUR LL χ−−=  
Using MATLAB to determine the likelihood function value of the restricted model, a p-
value of 0.148613 is determined according to the LR test statistic.  The hypothesis is not 
rejected because the p-value exceeds the chosen level of significance at 0.05, and 
supports the earlier conclusion that manure experience does not increase a crop 
producers’ WTP.  In addition to this test, numerous hypothesis tests can be conducted 
across several variables to determine the joint significance of variables influencing a crop 
producers’ decision to accept application.  Now, take a look at manure type and form in 
the Calibrated Model – 2 to see if the combined affects of dryswine and liquidswine 
estimates differ from zero (HO: β4= β5= 0 vs. HA: β4≠ β5≠ 0).  The hypothesis is not 
                                                 
13 The p-value of a hypothesis test is calculated by finding the probability that the t-distribution can take a 
value greater than or equal to the absolute value of the sample value of the test statistic (Hill, Griffiths, and 
Judge).  In other words, if the p-value exceeds the chosen level of alpha, then the hypothesis is not rejected.  
The hypothesis is rejected if the p-value is less than alpha. 
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rejected with a p-value 0.1702, supporting the estimates of Table 5 that premiums do not 
exist for manure type and form.   
In one final attempt to determine if the combined affects of the four variables, 
aside from savings and the intercept, differ from zero, a LR test is conducted (HO: β3= 
β4= β5= β6=0 vs. HA: β3≠ β4≠ β5≠ β6≠0).  At the 5% level, the hypothesis is rejected.  This 
suggests that jointly, the variables differ from zero and describe some of the variation 
observed in crop producers’ WTP.  However, no individual manure attribute or producer 
characteristic is statistically strong enough to be detected individually.  These models 
reveal little about the variation in crop producers WTP.  It is surprising that form, type, 
experience, and savings are not significant given the raw statistics revealed by producers 
in Chapter 3.  What can be said is that both sets of models estimate the WTP value to lie 
between $0 and $10.  Unexplained behavior by producers may stem from the possibility 
that many producers are aware of the good, but are skeptical of its use in their systems.  
The greater probability is that the model does not account for a number of other 
explanatory variables driving crop producers’ decision to purchase.  Referring to the 
“Demand for Livestock Manure” section in Chapter 2 appears to support the idea that 
numerous factors determine demand for livestock manure.  Given the large number of 
explanatory variables for manure demand, it may be that without an extremely large 
sample size, coefficient significance for a single variable will be difficult to detect.  The 
next section analyzes at the demographic variables to identify any potential correlation 
with WTP. 
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Crop Producer Demographics 
This section analyzes the effect of several demographic variables measured in the 
survey sample.  The impacts of farm size, household producer income, and regional 
location on a crop producers’ WTP are measured.  Models employ the use of both 
calibrated and uncalibrated data to develop lower and upper bounds for WTP.  Provided 
the lack of explanatory power from manure attributes, the researcher is looking to 
determine if demographical factors are highly correlated with a producers’ decision to 
purchase manure. 
 
Household Income 
This model identifies the effects of a producer’s income on WTP.  Table 6 
includes parameter estimates for four models.  The first two models consider savings and 
income in the linear form.  Recall from Table 3 that income is scaled according to the 
maximum category.  Therefore, the salary for an individual earning less than $20,000 is 
assigned a value of 0.2 and those greater than $80,000 is equal to one.  As mentioned 
earlier, the sample is reduced to 278 because 11 respondents did not indicate an income 
range during the course of the survey.  The first two models are represented by the 
following equation. 
(16) WTP = β1 + β2[savings] + β3[income] + ε  
where the reference group is only savings10.   
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Table 6.  Income Effect on Crop Producers’ Willingness-to-Pay 
 Uncalibrated 
Model - 1 
Calibrated 
Model - 1 
Uncalibrated 
Model - 2 
Calibrated 
Model - 2 
 Parameter Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept 0.4632 
(0.0892) 
-7.4391 
(-1.4896) 
4.8973 
(0.3711) 
-0.5473 
(-0.0449) 
Savings -0.6286 
(0.1787) 
-1.8468 
(-0.6086) 
-0.5003 
(-0.1423) 
-1.6683 
(-0.5495) 
Income     15.0826** 
(1.9699) 
8.3826 
(1.2999) 
-0.3103 
(-0.0072) 
-14.8879 
(-0.3893) 
Income2   11.3678 
(0.3637) 
16.9989 
(0.6159) 
Standard Dev. 
of Error Term 
      21.5007*** 
(5.2670) 
      18.8381*** 
(5.5426) 
      21.3998*** 
(5.1841) 
      18.6491*** 
(5.5185) 
*, **, *** Indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance. 
Log Likelihood Function Value: -164.6706 (Uncalibrated 1) & -169.2157 (Calibrated 1) 
Log Likelihood Function Value: -169.0268 (Uncalibrated 2) & -164.6049 (Calibrated 2) 
Sample size is 278. 
The first uncalibrated model finds the income variable to be significant at the 95% 
confidence level and suggests a positive influence on WTP.  One should exercise caution, 
however, in this conclusion as it appears the estimator is assigning value to the income 
variable rather than the intercept.  This is apparent as the intercept has become 
insignificant in this model, contrary to its previous significance.  Nonetheless, this is the 
first sign of a significant coefficient outside the intercept and error terms.  This estimation 
indicates that a crop producer, whose income exceeds $80,000, would be willing to pay 
approximately $15 more per acre for livestock manure. 
When the model is calibrated, the income variable becomes insignificant.  To 
confirm the model estimate, a LR test is conducted on the calibrated income variable.  It 
fails to reject the hypothesis test (HO: β3=0 vs. HA: β3≠0) with a p-value of 0.1718.   
Realizing that a quadratic representation of income might better represent the 
marginal purchasing power of income, Uncalibrated and Calibrated models – 2 include a 
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squared income variable and yield the following equation (reference group same as for 
Equation 16): 
(17) WTP = β1 + β2[savings] + β3[income] + β4[income2] + ε. 
 
None of the parameter estimates is significant in the two models.  A joint LR test 
for the two income variables in the calibrated model confirms the conclusion.  The 
hypothesis of HO: β3= β4=0 vs. HA: β3≠ β4≠0 does not reject the null with a p-value of 
0.1341.  Review of the last two models also suggests that total WTP for manure is $0.  To 
confirm this observation, the researcher conducts the following hypothesis test on the 
Uncalibrated and Calibrated Models – 2: HO: β2= β3= β4= 0 vs. HA: β2≠ β3≠ β4≠ 0.  The 
hypothesis test for the uncalibrated model is rejected with a p-value of 0.0299.  However, 
the researcher fails to reject HO with a p-value of 0.1134 on the calibrated model.  This 
suggests to the researcher that despite the reduction in commercial fertilizer costs and 
other benefits, if crop producers are willing to pay for manure, the producers’ income 
effect is very small, if any at all.  Most likely, producers are willing to accept manure, but 
are unlikely to pay for it because they are aware of the regulations associated with using 
manure and that livestock producers hold a poorly demanded product. 
 
Farm Size 
Following producer income insignificance, the researcher tests for operation size 
significance.  Like the income variables, the acres managed variable is categorized into 
five sections and then scaled by the largest category.  This means that the values 
representing category size range from 0.2 to 1 (Refer to Table 3).  Table 7 contains both 
calibrated and uncalibrated model estimates for the linear and quadratic acres variables.  
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Equations for the linear and quadratic models follow in respective order.  Again, only 
savings10 serves as the reference group. 
(18) WTP = β1 + β2[savings] + β3[acres] + ε. 
(19) WTP = β1 + β2[savings] + β3[acres] + β4[acres2] + ε. 
Table 7.  Impact of Farm Size on Willingness-to-Pay 
 Uncalibrated 
Model - 1 
Calibrated 
Model - 1 
Uncalibrated 
Model - 2 
Calibrated 
Model - 2 
 Parameter Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept     9.5220** 
(2.0661) 
    -8.5629** 
(-2.1087) 
    20.9978** 
(2.3666) 
-4.4489 
(-0.5979) 
Savings 1.0482 
(0.3096) 
-0.6461 
(-0.2118) 
1.1231 
(0.3305) 
-0.5797 
(-0.1903) 
Acres 0.8019 
(0.1037) 
  13.1657* 
(1.8808) 
-58.6397 
(-1.5535) 
-7.4168 
(-0.2310) 
Acres2   60.4284 
(1.6102) 
20.5786 
(0.6560) 
Standard Dev. 
of Error Term 
      21.7648*** 
(5.2823) 
      19.3576*** 
(5.5969) 
      21.2756*** 
(5.2940) 
      19.2612*** 
(5.6059) 
*, **, *** Indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance. 
Log Likelihood Function Value: -173.8585(Uncalibrated 1) & -176.3901 (Calibrated 1) 
Log Likelihood Function Value: -172.4678 (Uncalibrated 2) & - 176.1740 (Calibrated 2) 
Sample size is 287. 
We observe in the first calibrated model that acres is significant at a 90% 
confidence level.  The three other models yield no significant estimates for the income or 
savings variables.  Given the results of the first set of models, the researcher believes that 
acre size may correlate with WTP, but the estimate is statistically weak at only a 90% 
confidence level.  The second set of models does not identify a relationship between acre 
size and WTP and deems the estimates’ signs and magnitudes insignificant.  To confirm 
this, the following LR test is conducted on both models (2): HO: β3= β4= 0 vs. HA: β3≠ 
β4≠ 0.  A joint LR test of the income variables for the uncalibrated model verifies the 
weak significance with a p-value of 0.0947 and the calibrated model yields a p-value of 
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0.0405.  Collectively, the researcher concludes that acres managed as an explanatory 
variable does influence average WTP, but is weak.  Thus, as the number of acres 
managed increases, so too does a crop producer’s WTP.  In summary, the linear models 
suggest WTP to be between $4 and $10.  Quadratically, the WTP estimate ranges from 
$0 to $21.  One would expect the WTP interval to narrow as a quadratic term for farm 
size is introduced, because a quadratic term allows for flexibility in the estimate to model 
a more realistic relationship that is non-linear. 
 
Regional Location 
Oklahoma consists of a number of different climates and topography.  In this 
study, the state is divided into four quadrants using Interstates 35 and 40 as regional 
boundaries.  A map of Oklahoma and the respective boundaries is located in the 
demographics section of Chapter 3.  Provided the discussion in Chapter 3, one might 
suspect that the contrast of production practices could influence the WTP of producers in 
the regions.  To test this theory, the following equation is estimated with savings10  and 
southeast  as the reference group.   
(20) WTP = β1 + β2[savings] + β3[southwest] + β4[northwest] + β5[northeast] + ε. 
Estimates in Table 8 reveal that no region differs significantly from the southeast 
region.  Although the signs and magnitudes of each variable provide no information 
about WTP, the intercepts again suggest that WTP ranges from approximately $0 to 
about $10.  What this information does provide to producers is that despite a facilities’ 
regional location, one is no more advantaged or disadvantaged in locating producers 
willing to accept/pay for livestock manure.  One should consider however, that these 
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regional climates and land topography will affect the rates of application because rainfall 
and land slope largely influence the potential for runoff and water pollution.  This 
regional estimation cannot consider the environmental considerations that livestock 
producers are forced to consider before applying manure on off-farm acres.  Despite its 
obscurity in this model, stricter regulations observed in the CAFO Rule may eventually 
create a regional affect on WTP that is not yet observable. 
Table 8.  Regional Influence on Willingness-to-Pay 
 Uncalibrated Model Calibrated Model 
 Parameter Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept   8.9438* 
(1.9048) 
0.5519 
(0.1338) 
Savings 0.6998 
(0.2085) 
-0.4811 
(-0.1669) 
Southwest -0.9093 
(-0.1792) 
-4.7129 
(-0.9766) 
Northwest 0.4158 
(0.0810) 
-2.0089 
(-0.4137) 
Northeast 4.5011 
(0.8062) 
-3.5808 
(-0.7489) 
Standard Deviation of 
Error Term 
      21.2939*** 
(6.1218) 
      19.7766*** 
(5.6178) 
*, **, *** Indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance. 
Log Likelihood Function Value: -174.3713 (Uncalibrated) and -178.2025 (Calibrated) 
Sample size is 289. 
 
Evidence from the previously discussed models exhibits little information to a 
concerned livestock producer about marketing alternatives.  As the researcher has 
demonstrated, WTP is not affected by the numerous demographics and manure attributes 
measured in the survey.  However, it is certain that WTP varies across crop producers.  
To reveal the probability that a crop producer will pay a given price, the next section 
focuses on the development of a cumulative distribution and its implications to livestock 
producers. 
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Distribution of Crop Producers’ Willingness-to-Pay  
Previous sections of the chapter focused on how particular variables affected the 
average WTP of crop producers.  This section focuses on developing a distribution for 
WTP.  In this process, the researcher estimates a cumulative distribution function (cdf) 
using both calibrated and uncalibrated data.  The cdf is constructed as follows.  Recall 
that the manure price could take one of 35 prices, ranging from -10, -9,…,-1, 1,…,24, to 
2514.  For each price appearing on the survey, the percentage of crop producers not 
accepting the offer is calculated to determine the percentage of producers declining the 
offer at each given price level.  A regression analysis is then employed to estimate the 
correlation between the percentage of producers declining the offer and the respective 
price offered.  With the percentage of producers declining the offer serving as the 
dependent variable, Excel’s regression analysis option is used to estimate the relationship 
both linearly and quadratically.  This linear relationship is expressed with the following 
model: 
(21) %No = β1 + β2[P] 
Intuitively, if β1 + β2[$0] = 35%, then the WTP for 35% of producers is less than $0 and 
WTP for 65% exceeds $0.  Conducting these estimates across all prices, allows the 
researcher to determine a cumulative distribution for crop producers’ WTP and the 
subsequent probability distribution function. 
 
                                                 
14The price of $0 was not presented in the survey, and therefore that category is not present in the data set 
used for estimation. 
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Uncalibrated Willingness-to-Pay Distribution 
The first cumulative distribution functions are estimated using uncalibrated data.  
One should note that results generated by the uncalibrated data set may be subject to bias 
as “uncertain” respondents are not calibrated as “No” responses.  Contrary to previous 
uncalibrated models, producers who answered, “No Answer” are not considered an 
observation.  Therefore, the sample size is only 236. 
The first linear regression model has an adjusted r-square of 0.3995, which 
suggests that almost 40% of crop producers’ WTP is explained by the price offered.  The 
regression generates the following model.   
(22) %No = 0.1799 + 0.0206 [P] 
  (3.2613)    (4.8597) 
where the numbers in parentheses represent the coefficients’ t-statistics. 
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Figure 14.  Percent of Crop Producers Declining Offer (Assumption Set A) 
The model suggests that as a producer is asked to pay a higher price for manure, 
the percentage of producers declining the offer increases.  This coincides with demand 
 102
theory, such that as price increases, demand decreases.  To allow for a non-linear cdf, a 
quadratic price term is included in the next estimation.   
(23) %No = β1 + β2[P] + β3[P2] 
Interpretation of the quadratic model’s cumulative distribution remains the same 
as applied to the linear model.  The quadratic model yields slightly different results and 
produces an adjusted r-square of 0.4293. 
(24) %No = 0.1403 + 0.0097[P] +0.0007[Pi2] 
 (2.3835)    (1.2431)       (1.6501) 
The two price terms are not significant at 95% confidence, but a joint f-test of the 
variables (HO: β2= β3=0 and HA: β2≠ β3≠0) yields an f-statistic15 of 13.7861, exceeding 
the 5% critical value of 3.295 and rejecting HO.  By jointly testing for significance, we 
find that the effect observed in the estimation is indeed different from zero, despite the 
lack of significance for each term, individually.   
                                                 
15 The general f-statistic is given by the following equation.  ( )
( )KTSSE
JSSESSEF
U
UR
−
−= /  where SSER represents the 
sum of squared errors for the restricted model, SSEU is the sum of squared errors for the unrestricted model, 
J is the number of hypotheses, T is the number of observations, and K is the number of coefficients 
estimated in the model. 
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Figure 15.  Percent of Crop Producers Declining Offer (Assumption Set B) 
In Figure 15, we note a couple of things differ from the linear estimate.  First, 
note how this model’s intercept is greater than zero.  This indicates that despite being 
paid $10 an acre to accept manure, there remains the probability that a producer will not 
accept the manure.  The model also suggests a strong relationship between the offer price 
and the percentage of acceptance.  Another interesting observation about this model is the 
signs observed for the linear and quadratic price terms.  Both signs are positive 
suggesting that as the price of manure increases, the percentage of declining producers 
accelerates at a greater rate.  For instance, let us compare the decreasing rate of 
acceptance between the linear and quadratic models.  For the linear model, the decreasing 
rate of acceptance is constant at 10% across each $5 interval.  For example, at the price of 
$-5, the rate of acceptance is 92%, at $0 it is 82%, and so forth.  However, for the 
quadratic model, at the price of $-5, acceptance is 89%.  Across the next interval, 
acceptance declines to 86%, a difference of only 3%.  From $15 to $20, acceptance 
declines from 55% to only 37% (18% decrease).   
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If we consider that the percentage of declining producers also represents the 
substitutability of livestock manure for commercial fertilizer, then one can infer about the 
willingness to substitute between livestock manure and commercial fertilizer.  When the 
price is negative, the marginal rate of substitution is high.  This suggests that if crop 
producers are compensated, manure’s substitutability with commercial fertilizer is high.  
As the price begins to increase, the marginal rate of substitution quickly begins to decline 
to the point at which manure is virtually not substitutable with commercial fertilizer. 
In the next section, the researcher calibrates the data to recode “uncertain Yes” 
and “No Answer” responses to “No” responses and measure the effects on the cumulative 
distribution of crop producers. 
 
Calibrated Willingness-to-Pay Distribution 
In this data set, the researcher used the calibrated data adjusted for crop producers 
uncertain in their decision and those who declined to answer the question for a number of 
reasons.  Collectively, interpretation of estimates and the implications will be the same as 
in the previous section.  The linear model estimate using calibrated data yielded the 
following equation with an adjusted r-square of 0.4297: 
(25)  %No = 0.5151 + 0.0184 [P] 
  (11.1273)  (5.1588) 
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Figure 16.  Percent of Crop Producers Declining Offer (Assumption Set C) 
Reviewing these results, the first observation about this model is the increased 
number of respondents declining the offer.  In comparison to both the linear and 
quadratic models in the previous section, the percentage of respondents declining the 
offer is significantly higher.  This puts into context the consequential effects of 
hypothetical bias if it is not considered.  In this instance, the percentage of producers 
accepting manure at a price of $-10, went from 100% in the uncalibrated model to only 
70% in the calibrated model.  Even the uncalibrated quadratic model, which estimated 
12% of crop producers would decline application at $-10, was well below the 33% of this 
model.  Notice also that at the price of $25 per acre, less than 3% of producers are 
predicted to have an average WTP that exceeds that value.   
Now let us look at the quadratic cumulative distribution model for WTP.  
Equation 26 provides the coefficient estimates and respective t-statistics. 
(26)  %No = 0.5149 + 0.0183[P] +0.00002[P2] 
 (10.0054)  (2.6878)        (0.0059) 
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Figure 17.  Percent of Crop Producers Declining Offer (Assumption Set D) 
The first thing to notice is that despite being quadratic, the model appears linear.  
Upon review of the coefficient estimates, the price2 term is insignificant and the intercept 
and income variables are only fractionally different from the linear estimates.  This model 
actually produces a marginally weaker adjusted r-square of 0.4118.  The linear depiction 
of the model despite being quadratic suggests to the researcher that the probability 
distribution function for crop producers’ WTP may be uniform.   
Reviewing the four models, the obvious trend is that producer purchases decline 
as the price increases.  However, the estimated percentage of decline was quite different 
across the model estimates.  To better articulate the results from the four models, the 
researcher creates a table that documents the offer price and the predicted cumulative 
percentage of crop producers’ declining the offer.  One of most prominent observations is 
how calibrating the data increases the percentage of respondents declining the offer at $-
10.  We also note that at $25 in the calibrated models, only a very small percentage of 
producers would accept manure.  In general, the calibrated models depict a more 
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disappointing outlook for producers seeking off-farm acres for manure spreading.  
Despite the reduced acceptance rates predicted by the calibrated models, almost 50% of 
crop producers are willing to pay a price above $0. 
Table 9.  Cumulative Percent of Producers Declining Offer 
Price Uncalibrated Model Calibrated Model 
 N = 236 N = 289 
 Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic 
$-10 0.0% 11.7% 33.1% 33.2% 
$-5 7.7% 11.0% 42.3% 42.3% 
$0 18.0% 14.0% 51.5% 51.5% 
$5 28.3% 20.7% 60.7% 60.7% 
$10 38.6% 31.1% 69.9% 69.9% 
$15 48.9% 45.1% 79.1% 79.1% 
$20 59.2% 62.8% 88.3% 88.3% 
$25 69.6% 84.1% 97.4% 97.5% 
 
 
Summary 
In summary, this study has found that a crop producer’s decision to purchase 
manure is largely driven by the price.  Outside price, few manure attributes and producer 
demographics are found to significantly correlate with purchasing behavior under the 
assumptions of a normal WTP distribution and random utility theory.  This raises the 
question that if producers are inconsiderate of other manure attributes, outside price, can 
the contingent valuation results be validated?  As noted by Carson in the literature 
review, estimates of unbiased studies should follow basic demand theory in terms of price 
sensitivity and satisfy scope tests, where consumers recognize and pay a difference for 
greater quality.  Should producers then be willing to pay more for manure that increases 
commercial fertilizer savings by means of more nutrients, suggesting a higher quality 
product?  This may be the case, but Carson also notes that alternative estimation 
procedures should be employed.  This could include anything from the estimation 
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procedure to assuming a skewed rather than normal distribution of willingness-to-pay.  
Before the results of this study can be discounted, alternative methods must be sought.  
Unfortunately, time and scope do not allow us to answer these questions at this time.  
Therefore, we must move forward with the results of this study at this place in time.   
Results suggest that income and farm size may have some effect on a crop 
producers’ WTP, but the inconsistency of the variables across several models reduces the 
reliability of the estimates.  The lack of explanatory power for WTP with the given 
variables is somewhat surprising.  One suspects there is the possibility that producers are 
making decisions from unmeasured variables such as commercial fertilizer cost per acre, 
percentage of total operating costs assigned to commercial fertilizer, or purpose of the 
agricultural operation (e.g. tax write-off, hobby, or primary income) (Other potential 
components of manure demand are discussed at the end of Chapter 2.).  Additionally, 
producers may be influenced by the perceived consequences of manure use on crops such 
as weeds, foreign matter, soil compaction, etc.  Certainly, WTP varies greatly across crop 
producers.  At negative prices, a majority of crop producers will accept manure.  
However, as price increases, so do the number of crop producers declining the offer.  The 
key for livestock producers to optimize income from manure exportation will be to 
identify the threshold value for each individual crop producer.   
Even with the lack of explanatory variables, the survey results do offer hope for 
livestock producers by revealing that an outlet for livestock manure exists for producers 
falling under federal compliance and seeking additional land.  Both the linear and 
quadratic regression models suggest that a high percentage of crop producers are willing 
to accept manure when the cost is $0.  The key to developing a market sensitive to 
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product attributes and paying a price exceeding $0 may become a matter of consumer 
(crop producer) education and greater marketing efforts.  As more livestock operations 
become compliant with regulations and spread manure to surrounding cropland, a similar 
survey in the future could hold a significantly greater degree of explanatory power for 
crop producers’ purchasing decisions of livestock manure. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Almost two years after the EPA’s final rule regulating CAFOs became effective, 
livestock producers continue to become compliant and explore alternatives to offset the 
incurring costs.  In light of the predicament that many livestock producers were 
experiencing, it became apparent to the researcher that more information was needed to 
enlighten livestock producers and researchers assessing the economic impacts of these 
regulations.  As the final rule requires all CAFOs to apply for a National Pollution 
Discharge Elimination System permit and implement a Comprehensive Nutrient 
Management Plan by the end of 2006, the regulations limit the flexibility in manure 
application for livestock producers (Boman).  This subsequently increases expenses for 
livestock producers.  The EPA admits that the final rule will be expensive, carrying a 
price tag of $335 million a year.  However, the EPA’s objective is to work with the 
agricultural industry to control water pollution from the largest livestock operations, 
while simultaneously maintaining a strong and viable American agriculture (USEPA).   
Recognizing a shortage of information existed in academic research on this topic 
and a need for specific costs beyond an aggregate cost estimate for the industry, the 
researcher sought to reveal crop producers’ manure preferences in regard to attributes and 
demographics.  The absence of a functional and observable market for manure limited 
previous studies that employed traditional valuation approaches in determining what 
factors were important to crop producers in their decision to accept livestock manure as a 
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commercial fertilizer substitute.  This predicament prompted the use of contingent 
valuation and random utility theory to determine decision factors influencing crop 
producers’ purchases of manure in a hypothetical market.   
Recall the study’s two objectives: (1) determine correlation of crop producers’ 
willingness-to-pay with manure attributes and producer demographics, and (2) identify a 
willingness-to-pay distribution for crop producers accepting livestock manure.  To obtain 
the data necessary to complete such a study, a contingent valuation survey is employed.  
Few transactions occur between crop and livestock producers for manure, and those that 
do are poorly documented.  Therefore, a hypothetical market administered through a mail 
survey provided the hypothetical transactions for data collection. 
The survey gathers information from producers across the State of Oklahoma who 
previously indicated a willingness to participate in university research projects.  This 
generates 289 useful survey responses measuring numerous variables, including farm 
size, manure preferences, crops managed, household income, and livestock managed.   
In satisfying the objectives, the first is partially satisfied as variables are 
summarized for the entire sample.  Summary statistics from the survey reveal several 
behaviors about crop producers.  First is that Oklahoma’s crop producers are diversified 
across livestock and crop industries.  Over 92% of the surveyed crop producers manage a 
cow-calf operation, stockers, or both.  As expected, the primary crop grown in Oklahoma 
is wheat, with at least 89% of respondents involved with wheat production at some 
capacity (i.e. grain, grazing, or dual).  The average number of acres managed by each 
respondent is 2,178 acres with an average household income of $68,870.   
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Producers also indicated a number of manure preferences outside the context of 
the contingent valuation question.  Approximately 46% of producers would prefer 
manure incorporation at the time of application, but a large percentage (38%) does not 
have a preference.  The most common timing restriction that producers indicated for 
application is for spreading to take place after harvest and prior to planting.  For many 
livestock producers, this would impose an even smaller window to remove waste from 
the operation.  55% of producers did not express a preference for solid or liquid manure, 
and less than 25% of producers have any experience with manure as a commercial 
fertilizer substitute in the last ten years.   
Satisfying the second part of the first objective includes constructing several 
models to reveal the correlation between crop producers’ WTP and specific manure 
attributes and demographics.  To minimize the impacts that hypothetical bias can have on 
estimation procedures, both calibration and cheap talk techniques are employed.  All 
observations are influenced by the cheap talk mechanism that precedes the contingent 
valuation question.  This helps to reduce respondents’ natural tendency to overstate WTP.  
Calibration is also employed to reduce the likelihood of hypothetical bias.  Changing “No 
Answer” and uncertain “Yes” responses to “No,” creates a data set biased toward 
underestimating the average WTP of crop producers.  Likewise, the uncalibrated data set 
should be biased toward overestimating average WTP.  As explained in the previous 
chapters, this creates an interval in which the true value for WTP should be observed.   
A large percentage of the explanatory variables were insignificant in explaining 
the willingness-to-pay of crop producers.  Differences in the type of livestock manure, 
the physical form of manure (liquid or solid), and whether manure was incorporated or 
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not fails to influence crop producers’ WTP.  However, a joint likelihood test confirms 
that the effect of dryswine, liquidswine, experience, and incorporation collectively differ 
from zero, but the individual impact of each variable is undetectable.  Even more 
surprising is that producers do not express a difference in value for the levels of savings 
(nutrient content) in commercial fertilizer costs.  This indicates to the researcher that crop 
producers willing to pay for manure are not likely to pay the manure’s full nutrient value.  
Crop producers’ income did appear to influence the WTP of crop producers.  In the linear 
estimate, income positively influenced WTP.  However, calibrated models contradicted 
this observation by failing to distinguish a significant relationship.  Given the assumed 
bounds that the calibrated and uncalibrated models determine, the effect of income is 
assumed to be marginal.   
Farm size is the only variable found to be significant across both calibrated and 
uncalibrated models.  Under a linear estimation, the calibrated model indicated a $13 
increase in WTP for producers whose acres managed exceeded 10,000 acres.  Quadratic 
estimates found neither acres coefficient (linear and quadratic acres variables) to be 
significant, but a joint likelihood ratio test indicates collective significance for the 
variables at 90% for the uncalibrated model and 95% for the calibrated model.  This 
confirms that a measurable correlation exists between crop producers’ farm size and their 
WTP value.  Thus, as the number of acres managed by a crop producer increases, so does 
her value for livestock manure. 
The last variable tested for significance was regional location.  Despite the 
divergence between management practices observed in different regions of the state, 
WTP is not affected.  This does not go without saying however, that nutrient management 
 114
plans are largely affected by soil types, slope of the land, annual average rainfall, crop-
nutrient requirements, and proximity to surface waters.  Given these factors, there is no 
question that livestock producers in different regions will face a different set of 
circumstances.  Therefore, crop producers likely face challenges in not only locating a 
producer willing to accept manure application, but one whose land and crop 
characteristics satisfy the restraints of their own nutrient management plan.  The positive 
aspect is that, in general, the models suggest that the average WTP value is between $0 
and $10.  In some instances, that range was expanded to $15 and $21, but consistent 
estimates appear to be between $0 and $10.  Additionally, this suggests that livestock 
producers “on average” will not have to pay crop producers to accept manure on off-farm 
acres.  Some livestock producers may have to pay for manure removal, but across a large 
sample of crop producers, most crop producers will accept manure and some will even 
pay a price less than or equal to its nutrient value.   
The second objective is satisfied by developing a cumulative distribution function 
for all crop producers’ WTP.  Recall that for each price appearing on the survey, the 
number of crop producers not accepting the offer is calculated to determine the 
percentage of producers declining the offer at each given price level (-10, -9, …, -1, 1, 
…, 24, 25).  Linear and non-linear regressions estimate the probability that a crop 
producer would decline the offer.  Uncalibrated regression estimates suggest that 
approximately 86% of crop producers would pay a price above $0 and 14% of crop 
producers’ WTP would be less than $0.  One should add a caveat about the percentage of 
producers accepting manure application at the price of $0.  There may be an unforeseen 
spike in the percentage of producers declining on the positive side of zero as the concept 
 115
of “free” manure changes to a positive price.  Nonetheless, estimates should not be 
greatly affected by this anomaly.  Calibrated estimates find that the split is almost 50%-
50% at $0, suggesting that half of producers’ WTP is greater than $0 and half is not.  
Provided these results, the actual percentage of crop producers willing to pay a price 
greater than $0 an acre is between 50% and 86%. 
Collectively, results suggest that manure price is the major determinant in a crop 
producers’ decision to purchase.  However, other explanatory variables such as the type 
and form of manure, management practices, income, etc., appear to reveal little 
information about an individual producer’s purchasing decision.  Because of the 
heterogeneity expressed across producers’ decision components, livestock producers may 
be advantaged by identifying only a few specific crop producers that are willing to accept 
manure.  Strong relationships could be established where prices and manure 
characteristics are negotiated prior to application.  This could alleviate search costs and 
the hassle of differentiating a manure product to be acceptable for the entire market. 
Nonetheless, overcoming the obstacles identified in this market must be 
accomplished by addressing the nutrient variation in manure, the inappropriate ratio of 
nitrogen and phosphorus to crop needs, and the higher application costs of diluted 
nutrients.  There is no question that manure management problems exist.  Regionally 
concentrated areas of livestock production have created stocks of manure that exceed the 
assimilative capacity of regional cropland.  Though this is of concern to livestock 
producers, this study has revealed that at a minimum, 50% of crop producers are willing 
to accept manure for free.  More encouraging is the fact that many crop producers are 
willing to pay a positive price.   
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OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY
Division of Agricultural and Natural Resources
Department of Agricultural Economics
October 8, 2003 
 
Jane Doe 
P. O. Box 7448 
Manure, OK 58837 
 
Dear Jane Doe: 
 
New government regulations are changing how livestock manure must be handled.  In particular, 
livestock producers may seek other farmers who are willing to accept their manure as fertilizer.  
Researchers at Oklahoma State University are evaluating strategies to minimize the impacts of 
these regulations to Oklahoma farms.  We are asking you to help us serve the Oklahoma farm 
community by completing the enclosed survey.  The survey should take approximately five 
minutes to complete. 
 
We would like the person who is most responsible for farm management on your operation to 
complete the enclosed survey.  Your responses will be kept strictly confidential by recording 
them using an identification number that reveals neither your name nor the farm location.   
 
Please return your completed survey to us in the enclosed postage paid envelope by December 
10.  If you have any questions regarding this survey, please call me at (405) 744-9820, and I will 
be happy to assist you.   
 
We greatly appreciate your help. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
F. Bailey Norwood 
Assistant Professor 
Oklahoma State University 
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YOUR RESPONSE IS VALUABLE TO US.  FOR THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS, 
PLEASE CHECK THE BOXES THAT BEST CORRESPOND TO YOUR OPERATION. 
 
1)  Please check any of the following you manage. 
 
     Winter wheat for grain 
   Winter wheat for grazing 
   Winter wheat for grazing & grain 
   Corn for grain 
   Corn for silage 
   Grain sorghum 
   Soybeans 
   Alfalfa hay 
 
   Other hay 
   Pasture 
   Cotton 
   Oats 
   Barley 
   Rye 
   Peanuts 
   Other (please specify) ___________
2)  How many crop or pasture acres do you currently manage? 
 
   0-499 acres 
   500-999 acres 
   1,000-2,999 acres 
 
   3,000-9,999 acres 
   Greater than 10,000 acres 
 
3)  Please check any of the following livestock you manage. 
 
   Cow/calf
   Stockers 
   Cattle on feed 
   Dairy cattle 
   Broilers 
 
   Other poultry 
   Swine 
   Sheep 
   Other (please specify): __________
4)   Has livestock manure been applied to any crop or pasture acres you managed in the last ten  
years?  
 
   No 
   Yes  
 
5)  Livestock manure can be applied as solid manure or liquid manure.  Assuming the costs to  
you were the same, if you allowed livestock manure applications to crop acres under your 
management, which manure form would you prefer?  
 
     I prefer solid manure  
     I prefer liquid manure 
     No preference 
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6)  Livestock manure can be incorporated into the soil by either tilling the soil after surface  
application or through manure injection.  Assuming the costs to you were the same, if you 
allowed livestock manure applications to crop acres under your management, would you 
prefer soil incorporation?   
 
     I would not prefer soil incorporation of manure 
     I would prefer soil incorporation of manure 
     No preference 
 
In the next question, we would like you to tell us how you feel about substituting livestock 
manure for commercial fertilizer.  Studies have found that people tend to overestimate 
their willingness to accept or pay money in hypothetical situations.  When answering the 
question, please consider how you would react if you actually had to pay or accept real 
money that could be used for other goods and services. 
 
7)  Suppose your crop has traditionally received commercial fertilizer but no livestock  
manure.  You now have the opportunity to let a nearby producer apply swine manure to your 
crop.  With the swine manure application, you would not need to apply commercial fertilizer 
and would save $20 per acre in commercial fertilizer costs.  The manure is of the liquid form 
and is incorporated into the soil.   
  
If the livestock producer offered to pay you $6 per acre to apply manure to your crop, would 
you accept the offer? 
  
 
 
 
8)  If you checked "No Answer" to the previous question, was this because? 
 
    Rough indifference between a "yes" or "no" answer 
    Inability to make a decision without more information 
    Preference for some other mechanism for making this decision 
    Other (please explain) 
 
 
9)  If you checked "Yes" to Question 7, on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means "very uncertain"  
and 10 means "very certain," how certain are you that you would accept $6 per acre for the 
manure application, if actually given the opportunity?  (CIRCLE ONE NUMBER) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
 
 
Yes No No Answer 
very 
uncertain 
very 
certain 
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10)  If you allowed livestock manure applications to crop acres under your management, what  
restrictions would you place on the timing of manure applications?     
 
I prefer applications after harvest 
and prior to planting 
I prefer applications during the 
growing season as long as it does 
not interfere with crop growth 
I would not place any restrictions on when 
manure can be applied 
Other 
  
11)  As close as you can recall, please estimate your household's yearly income before taxes by 
checking the appropriate box.  This question is used to ensure our sample is representative 
of all Oklahoma producers.  Please remember that your responses will be held strictly 
confidential. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12)  Do you have any additional comments about animal manure applications to your crops or  
pastures?  If so, please list them below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On behalf of Oklahoma State University, we thank you for your response! 
      
Bailey Norwood, Assistant Professor  
College of Agriculture Sciences and Natural Resources 
Oklahoma State University 
 
 
 
 
 
Oklahoma State University, in compliance with Title VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Executive Order 11246 as amended, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, and other federal laws and regulations, does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age, religion, disability, or status as a veteran in any of 
its policies, practices, or procedures.  
less than 
$20,000  
 $20,000- 
 $39,999 
 $40,000- 
 $59,999 
 $60,000- 
 $79,999 
 $80,000 or 
greater 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
VITA 
 
 
Ryan Lee Luter 
 
 
Candidate for the Degree of 
 
 
Master of Science 
 
 
Thesis: OKLAHOMA CROP PRODUCERS’ WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY FOR 
LIVESTOCK MANURE: A CONTINGENT VALUATION APPROACH 
 
Major Field:  Agricultural Economics 
 
Biographical:  
 
Personal Data: Born in Stillwater, Oklahoma on July 16, 1980, the son of Dannie 
L. and Patty J. Luter 
 
Education: Graduated from Morrison High School, Morrison, Oklahoma in May 
1999; Received Bachelor of Science degree in Agribusiness with minors 
in finance and business administration from Oklahoma State University, 
Stillwater, Oklahoma in May 2003.  Completed the requirements for the 
Master of Science degree with a Major in Agricultural Economics at 
Oklahoma State University in May 2005. 
 
Experience: Research Honor Scholar, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
August 1999 to May 2000; Biological Assistant Agricultural Research 
Service, USDA, April 2000 to September 2000; Sales Representative 
Intern, Range and Pasture Division, Dow AgroSciences, June 2001 to 
August 2001; Summer Loan Officer, Farm Credit Services of Eastern 
Oklahoma, U.S. AgBank, FCB, June 2002 to August 2002; Graduate 
Research Assistant, Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma 
State University, May 2003 to May 2005. 
 
Professional Memberships: American Agricultural Economics Association; 
Agricultural Economics Graduate Student Association, Oklahoma State 
University 
  
Name: Ryan L. Luter Date of Degree: May 2005 
 
Institution: Oklahoma State University Location: Stillwater, Oklahoma 
 
Title of Study: OKLAHOMA CROP PRODUCERS’ WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY FOR 
LIVESTOCK MANURE: A CONTINGENT VALUATION 
APPROACH 
 
Pages in Study:  128 Candidate for the Degree of Master of Science 
 
Major Field: Agricultural Economics 
 
Scope and Method of Study: The Environmental Protection Agency’s final rule revising 
the Clean Water Act in 2003 may force many livestock and poultry producers to 
seek off-farm acres to spread manure.  The impact of these regulations on 
confined animal feeding operations depends on crop producers’ willingness-to-
pay for manure.  Contingent valuation surveys, mailed to 512 Oklahoma crop 
producers, were used to determine the willingness-to-pay of crop producers. 
 
Findings and Conclusions: Numerous producer preferences for manure are examined in 
estimating Oklahoma crop producers’ average willingness-to-pay for livestock 
manure.  Crop producer income and farm size are shown to be correlated with 
willingness-to-pay.  Willingness-to-pay is not influenced by regional location in 
Oklahoma, livestock manure type, physical manure state (solid or liquid), or 
savings in commercial fertilizer costs.  Models suggest that the average 
willingness-to-pay for manure by crop producers is between $0 and $15 per acre.  
Cumulative distributions of crop producers’ willingness-to-pay suggest a market 
does exist for livestock producers seeking to export manure.  Conservative 
estimates reveal that approximately 50% of crop producers are willing to accept 
manure when it is applied and offered at the price of $0 per acre. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ADVISER’S APPROVAL:   
